CVE-1999-0519
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedA NETBIOS/SMB share password is the default, null, or missing.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThis vulnerability exists when NETBIOS/SMB shares have default, null (blank), or missing passwords configured. This allows unauthenticated or weakly authenticated remote attackers to access sensitive file shares, potentially reading, modifying, or deleting data, or using the compromised system for further network pivoting.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2000all versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Determine if SMB/NetBIOS service is enabledOn Windows systems, check the SMB service status via Services.msc or by running 'net start' in command prompt to see if 'Server' or 'Workstation' service is running. For older systems, verify NetBIOS over TCP/IP is bound to the network adapter.Affected if SMB/NetBIOS service is running and accessible on the network, creating an attack surface for the vulnerability.
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Enumerate all configured SMB sharesRun 'net share' from command prompt to list all shared folders, printers, and special shares (including IPC$) on the system. Review the output for any shares that may lack password protection.Affected if Any shares exist on the system that could be accessed without authentication or with default credentials.
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Inspect share access permissions for null/blank passwordsUse 'net share <sharename>' or check share properties in Computer Management to view the 'Everyone' or 'Guest' group permissions. Look for shares that allow access without a password prompt or with blank password fields.Affected if Shares grant access to the Everyone or Guest group without requiring a password, or allow null/blank passwords.
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Check for null session configurationOn Windows NT/2000, examine the registry key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA\RestrictAnonymous. A value of 0 allows null sessions. Also check HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters\NullSessionShares for shares that permit anonymous access.Affected if RestrictAnonymous is set to 0 or null session shares are not restricted, allowing anonymous enumeration of shares and user lists.
The system is affected if SMB/NetBIOS shares are configured with null, blank, or default passwords, or if null sessions are enabled, allowing unauthenticated remote access to file shares.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataConfigure strong, unique passwords on all SMB shares, disable null sessions at the registry level, and implement proper share-level access controls using authentication mechanisms.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-1999-0519 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-1999-0519 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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