CVE-1999-0701
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedAfter an unattended installation of Windows NT 4.0, an installation file could include sensitive information such as the local Administrator password.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceDuring Windows NT 4.0 unattended installations, configuration files (such as UNATTEND.TXT or similar setup answer files) could store the local Administrator password in plaintext. These files, if left on the system after installation, allow any user with file access to retrieve the credentials.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate unattended installation filesSearch the system for files named UNATTEND.TXT, UNATTEND.INF, SETUPANSWER.INF, or similar setup answer files. Common locations include the root of the system drive (C:\), the Windows directory, and the root of any partition.Affected if Any such file exists on the system from a previous or current installation
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Inspect file contents for plaintext passwordsOpen each found file using a text editor or type command and look for lines containing 'AdministratorPassword', 'Password', or similar password fields. Check if the value appears in plaintext rather than encrypted or blank.Affected if The file contains a plaintext (unencrypted) password value for the Administrator account
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Verify file permissions allow accessCheck file permissions on found files using Windows NT Explorer or the 'cacls' command to determine if standard users can read the file contents.Affected if The file is readable by non-privileged users, allowing them to obtain the plaintext credentials
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Check for multiple leftover installation filesSearch the entire system for any .TXT, .INF, or .INI files that may have been used for unattended installations and contain setup answer data.Affected if Additional configuration files with similar plaintext credential storage exist elsewhere on the system
The system is affected if any unattended installation file exists and contains a plaintext Administrator password that is accessible to users on the system.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataLocate and securely delete any遗留 unattended installation files on NT 4.0 systems that may contain plaintext passwords, and immediately change any Administrator passwords that may have been exposed.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-1999-0701 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-1999-0701 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data