CVE-2002-1975
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSharp Zaurus PDA SL-5000D and SL-5500 uses a salt of "A0" to encrypt the screen-locking password as stored in the Security.conf file, which makes it easier for local users to guess the password via brute force methods.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceSharp Zaurus PDA models SL-5000D and SL-5500 use a hardcoded salt value of 'A0' when encrypting screen-locking passwords stored in the Security.conf file. This static salt significantly reduces the computational work required for brute-force password attacks, as attackers can precompute hash tables using this known salt.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Identify the device modelCheck if the device is a Sharp Zaurus SL-5000D or SL-5500 model. This can be done by checking the device label, system information, or boot screen during startup.Affected if The device is a Sharp Zaurus SL-5000D or SL-5500 model.
-
Locate the Security.conf fileAccess the device's file system and locate the Security.conf file. On the Zaurus, this is typically found in the /home/etc/ directory or the device's configuration directory where security settings are stored.Affected if The Security.conf file exists on the device.
-
Examine the Security.conf file for password hash entriesOpen the Security.conf file using a text editor or cat command and look for entries related to screen lock password or encrypted password fields. Look for patterns indicating stored password hashes.Affected if The Security.conf file contains encrypted password or hash entries for the screen lock.
-
Inspect the salt value used in password encryptionExamine the password hash entries in Security.conf for the salt component. Look for the hexadecimal value 'A0' appearing consistently as the salt prefix or component in the password hash string.Affected if The salt value in the password hash entry is 'A0', indicating the hardcoded static salt is in use.
The device is affected if it is a Sharp Zaurus SL-5000D or SL-5500 with a Security.conf file containing screen lock password hashes that use the hardcoded salt value 'A0'.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace the static salt with a cryptographically random per-device or per-installation salt, and use a modern password hashing function like bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2. If the device firmware cannot be updated, consider alternative physical security measures to protect the Security.conf file.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation16.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,960.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2002-1975 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2002-1975 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data