CVE-2003-0391
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedFormat string vulnerability in Magic WinMail Server 2.3, and possibly other 2.x versions, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in the PASS command.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMagic WinMail Server 2.3 contains a format string vulnerability in the handling of the PASS command during SMTP authentication. User-supplied input in the password field is passed directly to format string functions without sanitization, allowing attackers to potentially read/write arbitrary memory locations, causing denial of service or potentially executing arbitrary code remotely.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 2.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Magic WinMail Server is installedCheck for the presence of Winmail Server in the system. Common locations: C:\Program Files\WinMail or look for the service named 'WinMail Server' in Windows services. On Linux, check for /usr/local/winmail or similar paths.Affected if Magic WinMail Server is found installed on the system
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Check the installed version numberLocate the version information - typically in the About dialog of the WinMail admin interface, or check the executable file properties of winmail.exe or mailserver.exe. Compare the version to 2.3.Affected if The installed version is 2.3 or any version lower than 2.3
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Verify SMTP service is enabledOpen WinMail Server admin panel and navigate to SMTP Server settings, or check if port 25 is listening. Use netstat -an | findstr :25 to check if SMTP is listening.Affected if SMTP service is running and accepting connections on port 25
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Confirm SMTP authentication is enabledIn WinMail admin interface, go to SMTP server settings and verify that SMTP authentication is turned on. This is required for the PASS command vulnerability to be reachable.Affected if SMTP authentication is enabled, allowing users to authenticate with username/password
A system is affected if Magic WinMail Server version 2.3 or lower is installed with SMTP service running and SMTP authentication enabled, as the format string vulnerability exists in the PASS command handling during authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to a patched version of Magic WinMail Server. If upgrading is not feasible, implement input validation to sanitize format string specifiers (%x, %s, %n, etc.) from user-supplied data before passing it to format string functions.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2003-0391 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2003-0391 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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