CVE-2005-3824
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe uploads module in vTiger CRM 4.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to upload arbitrary files, such as PHP files, via the add2db action.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe uploads module in vTiger CRM 4.2 and earlier contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to upload arbitrary files via the add2db action. The application fails to properly validate file types, sizes, or contents before storing uploaded files, enabling PHP scripts or other malicious code to be placed on the server for remote code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 4.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the installed vTiger CRM versionCheck the version.php file in the vtiger root directory or look at the about/credits page in the web interfaceAffected if The version is 4.2 or earlier (e.g., 4.2, 4.1, 4.0)
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Locate the uploads moduleInspect the modules/ directory for an uploads folder and check if the directory is accessible via the web serverAffected if The uploads directory exists under the web root and is web-accessible
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Verify the add2db action is accessibleCheck if modules/uploads/add2db.php or a similar path exists and is not protected by authenticationAffected if The add2db action file exists and can be accessed without authentication
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Inspect upload directory for unexpected file typesList all files in the uploads directory and check for file extensions other than expected types (e.g., .php, .php3, .phtml, .exe, .sh)Affected if Unexpected executable script files (.php, .php3, etc.) are found in the upload directory
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Check web server configuration for upload directoryReview the web server (Apache/nginx) configuration to verify if the uploads directory is configured to execute scriptsAffected if The uploads directory allows script execution (exec permissions or lacks AddType application/x-httpd-php restrictions)
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Review upload validation codeExamine the modules/uploads/ codebase for file type, size, or content validation functions before the add2db action processes uploadsAffected if No whitelist-based extension validation, MIME type checking, or content inspection is present in the upload handling code
A user is affected if they run vTiger CRM version 4.2 or earlier with the uploads module accessible via the web and the add2db action exposed without authentication, allowing unrestricted file uploads to a web-executable directory.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict and validate all file upload functionality using whitelist-based extension validation, MIME type checking, and file content inspection; store uploads outside the web root or in a non-executable directory; apply vendor patches or upgrade to a supported version.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,408.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2005-3824 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2005-3824 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data