CVE-2005-4326
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe web interface for American Power Conversion (APC) PowerChute Network Shutdown performs all communication in cleartext (base64-encoded), which allows remote attackers to sniff authentication credentials.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe APC PowerChute Network Shutdown web interface transmits all communication in base64-encoded format rather than using proper encryption. Base64 is encoding, not encryption, so authentication credentials can be easily decoded by anyone sniffing network traffic.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify web interface access protocolCheck if the APC PowerChute web interface is accessible via HTTP (port 80) or HTTPS (port 443) by attempting to connect to both and observing the responseAffected if The interface is accessible over HTTP without TLS encryption, indicating base64-encoded data is transmitted in cleartext
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Verify TLS/SSL configurationAccess the PowerChute administrative interface and navigate to the network or security settings to confirm whether SSL/TLS encryption is enabled for the web serverAffected if TLS/SSL encryption is disabled or not configured for the web interface
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Capture and inspect network trafficUse a network packet capture tool (such as Wireshark or tcpdump) to capture traffic between the client and the PowerChute web server during login. Extract the Authorization header from HTTP requestsAffected if The captured Authorization header contains base64-encoded credentials (e.g., Basic base64string) rather than encrypted TLS tunnel traffic, meaning credentials can be decoded with a base64 decoder
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Check for SSL certificate presentationWhen connecting to the web interface with a browser, verify whether an SSL certificate is presented and whether the connection uses HTTPS with a valid TLS handshakeAffected if No SSL certificate is presented and the connection does not establish TLS, confirming unencrypted (base64-only) communication
The environment is affected if the PowerChute web interface is accessed over HTTP without TLS/SSL enabled, allowing network sniffers to decode base64-encoded authentication credentials.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataEnable TLS/SSL encryption for the web interface to protect credentials in transit. If the product version does not support TLS, consider upgrading to a supported version or using network segmentation to limit exposure.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2005-4326 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2005-4326 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data