CVE-2006-2087
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Gmax Mail client in Hitachi Groupmax before 20060426 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application hang or erroneous behavior) via an attachment with an MS-DOS device filename.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Gmax Mail client in Hitachi Groupmax before version 20060426 does not properly validate attachment filenames, allowing remote attackers to cause denial of service by attaching files with MS-DOS device names (such as CON, PRN, AUX, NUL, COM1, LPT1). When processed, these special device filenames cause the application to hang or exhibit erroneous behavior.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Hitachi Groupmax installationSearch for Groupmax installation directories (commonly in Program Files/Hitachi or C:\Hitachi) or check Windows Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Hitachi for Groupmax entriesAffected if Hitachi Groupmax software is found on the system
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Identify installed Groupmax versionLocate version information in the installation directory (typically in a version.ini, about dialog, or registry key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Hitachi\Groupmax)Affected if Version is earlier than 20060426 or version information cannot be determined
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Verify mail component is configuredCheck if Groupmax Mail service is running or if mail-related processes (such as gmmail.exe or similar) are present in Task Manager or running as servicesAffected if Groupmax Mail component is installed and active
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Check email attachment processingReview mail gateway or Groupmax configuration settings to confirm if attachment processing is enabled for incoming messagesAffected if Attachment processing is enabled and the system processes inbound email attachments
The environment is affected if Hitachi Groupmax (any of the four components) is installed with a version earlier than 20060426 and the Mail component is configured to process email attachments.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate Hitachi Groupmax to version 20060426 or later to obtain the vendor patch. Alternatively, implement email gateway filtering to reject messages containing attachments with MS-DOS device filenames.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,808.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-2087 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-2087 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data