CVE-2006-2658
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedDirectory traversal vulnerability in the xsp component in mod_mono in Mono/C# web server, as used in SUSE Open-Enterprise-Server 1 and SUSE Linux 9.2 through 10.0, allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) sequence in an HTTP request.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceDirectory traversal vulnerability in mod_mono's xsp component allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files on the server by using '..' (dot-dot) sequences in HTTP request URLs.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versions= 1= 9.2= 9.3= 10.0= 10.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Mono XSP installationIdentify if Mono XSP or mod_mono is installed on the system by checking installed packages or binaries (e.g., rpm -qa | grep mono, dpkg -l | grep mono, or locate xsp/mono).Affected if Mono XSP or mod_mono is present on the server.
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Verify xsp component is enabledCheck if the xsp module is actively loaded or running as part of the web server configuration. Examine Apache configuration files for mod_mono directives or check for xsp processes.Affected if The xsp component of mod_mono is enabled and handling ASP.NET requests.
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Identify exposed HTTP endpointsReview web server configuration to determine which URLs/routes are served by the xsp module (typically paths like /asp, /xsp, or .aspx handlers).Affected if The server exposes HTTP endpoints handled by the xsp component to clients.
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Check for input validation on request pathsInspect configuration files or middleware to determine if there are rules rejecting '..' sequences in HTTP request URLs before they reach the xsp handler.Affected if No input validation exists to filter out '..' sequences from incoming request paths.
A server is affected if it has Mono XSP with the xsp component enabled and exposed via HTTP without validation to block '..' sequences in request URLs.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to a patched version of mod_mono/Mono, or implement input validation to reject HTTP requests containing '..' sequences in the path.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,408.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-2658 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-2658 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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