CVE-2006-3834
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedEJ3 TOPo 2.2.178 includes the password in cleartext in the ID field to index.php, which allows context-dependent attackers to obtain entry passwords via log files, referrers, or other vectors.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceEJ3 TOPo 2.2.178 passes user passwords in cleartext as part of the ID parameter submitted to index.php. This exposes authentication credentials through HTTP request logs, browser referrer headers, and potentially other logging mechanisms.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2.2.178CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed EJ3 TOPo versionLocate the version identifier in the application installation directory, typically found in a version file, about page, or metadata file within the EJ3 TOPo deploymentAffected if The installed version is exactly 2.2.178
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Locate the index.php entry pointFind the index.php file in the EJ3 TOPo web root directory and examine its authentication handling codeAffected if The code contains logic that accepts an ID parameter and processes it as a password credential
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Examine HTTP server access logsReview your web server access logs (Apache access.log, Nginx access.log, or equivalent) for requests to index.php containing the ID parameter with credential dataAffected if Log entries show GET or POST requests to index.php where the ID parameter contains what appears to be a password value in cleartext
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Inspect browser referrer dataCheck any stored referrer logs, analytics data, or browser history caches that may have captured URLs containing the ID parameterAffected if Referrer records contain URLs with the ID parameter showing cleartext credential information from EJ3 TOPo requests
You are affected if EJ3 TOPo version 2.2.178 is installed AND the application is using the ID parameter to transmit password credentials, evidenced by cleartext passwords appearing in server logs or referrer headers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace cleartext password transmission with proper session-based authentication using server-issued session tokens or secure tokenized identifiers instead of embedding credentials in URL parameters.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-3834 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-3834 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data