CVE-2006-4098
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedStack-based buffer overflow in the CSRadius service in Cisco Secure Access Control Server (ACS) for Windows before 4.1 and ACS Solution Engine before 4.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted RADIUS Accounting-Request packet.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Cisco Secure ACS CSRadius service. The service fails to properly validate input in RADIUS Accounting-Request packets, allowing an attacker to overwrite stack memory and execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the compromised service.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 3.0= 3.1= 3.2= 3.2\(1\)= 3.2\(1.20\)= 3.2\(2\)= 3.2\(3\)= 3.2.1= 3.2.2= 3.3= 3.3\(1\)= 3.3.1CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Cisco Secure ACS is installedCheck for the CSRadius service in Windows Services (services.msc) or look for Cisco Secure ACS installation directories (typically C:\CiscoSecureACS or /CSCOacs). On ACS Solution Engine, check for the application via web interface or CLI.Affected if CSRadius service or Cisco Secure ACS installation is present on the system
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Identify the installed ACS versionAccess the ACS web interface and navigate to System Administration > Configuration > System Info to view the version. Alternatively, check the version file in the installation directory or the registry key for ACS version information.Affected if The version matches any of these: 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.2(1), 3.2(1.20), 3.2(2), 3.2(3), 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3, 3.3(1), or 3.3.1
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Confirm CSRadius service is runningOpen Windows Services (services.msc) and locate the CSRadius service. Verify its status is Started. On ACS Solution Engine, check via CLI for the CSRadius process.Affected if The CSRadius service is running and accepting RADIUS connections
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Check if RADIUS Accounting is enabledIn the ACS web interface, go to Interface Configuration > RADIUS Advanced. Verify if Accounting is enabled under the RADIUS (Cisco) or RADIUS (IETF) settings. Check which network access servers are configured to send Accounting-Request packets.Affected if RADIUS Accounting is enabled and the service is accepting Accounting-Request packets from network devices
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Assess network exposure of the CSRadius serviceReview firewall rules and ACLs protecting the RADIUS port (default UDP 1813 for Accounting). Determine if the service is accessible from untrusted networks or only from trusted RADIUS clients.Affected if The CSRadius service (UDP port 1813) is accessible from untrusted or unknown network sources
You are affected if Cisco Secure ACS versions 3.0 through 3.3.1 are installed with the CSRadius service running and RADIUS Accounting is enabled, especially if the service is network-accessible.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Cisco Secure ACS for Windows or ACS Solution Engine to version 4.1 or later. If immediate patching is not feasible, restrict network access to the CSRadius service using firewalls or ACLs to limit exposure to trusted RADIUS clients only.
Cisco Secure Access Control Server 4.1
- Backup the Cisco Secure Access Control Server configuration data before beginning the upgrade
- Verify system requirements for ACS version 4.1 are met on the target Windows server or ACS Solution Engine appliance
- Obtain the Cisco Secure Access Control Server version 4.1 installer from the Cisco download portal or authorized distribution channels
- Stop the CSRadius service and other ACS services before initiating the upgrade
- Install ACS version 4.1 following the Cisco upgrade documentation for your deployment type (Windows or Solution Engine)
- After installation, verify that CSRadius service is running and the version is correctly reported as 4.1
- Restore the ACS configuration from the backup taken in step 1
- Test RADIUS authentication and accounting functionality to confirm normal operation
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-4098 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-4098 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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