CVE-2006-4275
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in catalogshop.php in the CatalogShop component for Mambo (com_catalogshop) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the mosConfig_absolute_path parameter.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidencePHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in the CatalogShop component for Mambo (com_catalogshop) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code by supplying a URL in the mosConfig_absolute_path parameter to catalogshop.php.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0_beta_2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify if CatalogShop component is installedCheck the Mambo administrator components list or inspect the /components/com_catalogshop/ directory for the presence of catalogshop.phpAffected if The com_catalogshop directory and catalogshop.php file exist on the server
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Determine CatalogShop component versionInspect the component's manifest file, README, or version metadata within the /components/com_catalogshop/ directory for version 1.0_beta_2Affected if The installed version is 1.0_beta_2 exactly
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Confirm vulnerable parameter usageExamine the catalogshop.php file for the presence of the mosConfig_absolute_path parameter being used in include/require statements without proper validationAffected if The code uses mosConfig_absolute_path in dynamic include/require functions without sanitization
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Check PHP allow_url_include settingReview php.ini or run phpinfo() to verify if the allow_url_include directive is enabledAffected if allow_url_include is set to On (enables remote file inclusion attacks)
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Test for unauthenticated parameter injectionAttempt a controlled test request to catalogshop.php with mosConfig_absolute_path pointing to a benign local file (e.g., /etc/passwd or a test.txt) to verify if the parameter is processedAffected if The parameter is accepted and the file is included/executed without authentication
A Mambo server is affected if the CatalogShop component version 1.0_beta_2 is installed with the vulnerable catalogshop.php file present and the mosConfig_absolute_path parameter is functional in the code.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpdate to a patched version of the CatalogShop component, or remove the component if no patch exists; additionally, disable allow_url_include in PHP configuration as a defense-in-depth measure.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation1.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,456.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-4275 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-4275 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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