CVE-2006-4562
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe proxy DNS service in Symantec Gateway Security (SGS) allows remote attackers to make arbitrary DNS queries to third-party DNS servers, while hiding the source IP address of the attacker. NOTE: another researcher has stated that the default configuration does not proxy DNS queries received on the external interface
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe DNS proxy service in Symantec Gateway Security (SGS) forwards arbitrary DNS queries from remote attackers to third-party DNS servers while concealing the attacker's source IP address. This turns the SGS device into an open DNS proxy, which can be abused for DNS amplification attacks, DNS poisoning attempts, or other malicious DNS activities. A researcher noted that the default configuration does not proxy DNS queries from the external interface, suggesting this may be a configuration-specific exposure or bypass.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.0= 320= 360= 360r= 5000_series_2.0.1= 5000_series_3.0= 5110= 5110_1.0= 5200= 5200_1.0= 5300= 5300_1.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Symantec Gateway Security product and versionAccess the device console or administrative interface and run 'version' or 'show system information' to retrieve the exact model number and firmware/software version. Compare against the affected list: 1.0, 320, 360, 360r, 5000_series_2.0.1, 5000_series_3.0, 5110, 5110_1.0, 5200, 5200_1.0, 5300, 5300_1.0Affected if The installed version matches any of the listed affected versions
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Verify DNS proxy service is enabledLog into the SGS administrative interface and navigate to DNS proxy or DNS forwarding settings. Check the service status. Alternatively, run 'show dns-proxy status' or 'show service dns-proxy' from the CLI if available.Affected if DNS proxy service is listed as enabled or running
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Inspect DNS proxy source interface configurationIn the DNS proxy settings, locate the configuration controlling which interfaces or IP addresses can submit queries to the proxy. Look for options labeled 'allow from', 'trusted sources', 'access list', or similar. Check if the external/WAN interface or 'any' is permitted.Affected if The external interface, WAN IP range, or 'any'/'0.0.0.0/0' is explicitly allowed as a source for DNS proxy queries
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Confirm DNS proxy accepts queries from untrusted networksFrom an external/untrusted network, send a DNS query to the SGS public IP on port 53 (UDP). Use a tool like 'dig @<SGS_public_IP> example.com' or 'nslookup example.com <SGS_public_IP>'. Observe if the query is answered and forwarded to upstream DNS servers.Affected if DNS queries sourced from external/untrusted networks are accepted and resolved by the SGS device, indicating the proxy is accessible from outside the trusted network
A user is affected if their SGS device runs an affected version, has DNS proxy enabled, and accepts or forwards DNS queries from external/untrusted sources, allowing the device to be abused as an open DNS proxy.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict the DNS proxy service to only accept and forward queries from trusted internal networks or hosts; disable DNS proxy functionality if not required, or implement firewall rules to prevent external sources from leveraging the proxy.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation3.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-4562 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-4562 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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