CVE-2006-4617
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in fileupload.html in vtiger CRM 4.2.4, and possibly earlier versions, allows remote attackers to upload and execute arbitrary files with executable extensions in the /cashe/mails folder.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in vtiger CRM 4.2.4's fileupload.html allows remote attackers to upload files with executable extensions (e.g., .php, .phtml) to the web-accessible /cashe/mails directory. Since the uploaded files can be directly accessed and executed by the web server, this enables arbitrary remote code execution without authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 4.2.4CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm vtiger CRM installation and versionLocate the vtiger CRM installation directory and identify the installed version by examining version.php, about.php, or similar version files in the web root or includes directory. Compare the version number against the affected range (4.2.4 and below).Affected if The installed vtiger CRM version is 4.2.4 or any version lower than 4.2.4.
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Verify presence of vulnerable fileupload.htmlSearch the vtiger CRM web root for the file named 'fileupload.html' - this is the vulnerable upload form. Check if this file exists in accessible web directories.Affected if The file fileupload.html exists in the vtiger CRM web-accessible directory.
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Check for the upload directory /cashe/mailsExamine the vtiger CRM directory structure for a directory named 'cashe/mails' (note: this appears as given in the CVE). Determine if this directory is located within the web document root and thus web-accessible.Affected if The directory cashe/mails exists and is web-accessible (inside the document root).
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Confirm script execution is allowed in upload directoryInspect the server configuration (Apache .htaccess, nginx config, or equivalent) for the cashe/mails directory. Check whether the directory permits execution of script files such as .php, .phtml, or other executable extensions.Affected if Script execution (PHP, CGI, etc.) is enabled or allowed in the cashe/mails directory.
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Verify upload functionality is accessible without authenticationAttempt to access the fileupload.html endpoint directly via HTTP request without providing any login credentials. Confirm whether the upload form loads and accepts requests from unauthenticated users.Affected if The fileupload.html page is accessible and functional without requiring authentication.
A user is affected if vtiger CRM version 4.2.4 or lower is installed, the fileupload.html file exists, the cashe/mails directory is web-accessible, and script execution is permitted in that directory - allowing unauthenticated remote code execution.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImmediately disable the vulnerable file upload functionality or restrict it to authenticated, trusted users only. Implement strict server-side validation of file types/extensions, rename uploaded files to non-executable names, and disable script execution in the upload directory. Consider upgrading to a patched version of vtiger CRM.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-4617 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-4617 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data