CVE-2006-4777
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedHeap-based buffer overflow in the DirectAnimation Path Control (DirectAnimation.PathControl) COM object (daxctle.ocx) for Internet Explorer 6.0 SP1, on Chinese and possibly other Windows distributions, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unknown manipulations in arguments to the KeyFrame method, possibly related to an integer overflow, as demonstrated by daxctle2, and a different vulnerability than CVE-2006-4446.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceHeap-based buffer overflow in the DirectAnimation.PathControl COM object (daxctle.ocx) in Internet Explorer 6.0 SP1 allows remote code execution via specially crafted arguments to the KeyFrame method, likely exploiting an integer overflow condition.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 6.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check Internet Explorer versionOpen IE, go to Help > About Internet Explorer. Verify the version is exactly 6.0 and Service Pack 1 is installed.Affected if The installed IE version is 6.0 SP1 - other versions (later or earlier) are not affected by this specific CVE.
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Locate the DirectAnimation component fileSearch for daxctle.ocx on the system. Common paths include C:\Windows\System32\ and C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\. Use: dir /s C:\daxctle.ocxAffected if The file daxctle.ocx exists on the system, indicating the DirectAnimation COM component is present.
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Verify DirectAnimation COM object registrationCheck Windows Registry for the DirectAnimation.PathControl CLSID. Look in HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\DirectAnimation.PathControl or use: reg query "HKCR\DirectAnimation.PathControl"Affected if The COM object is registered in the registry, meaning it can be instantiated by IE.
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Check if ActiveX control is enabled in IEIn IE, go to Tools > Internet Options > Security > Custom Level. Look for 'Run ActiveX controls and plugins' and 'Script ActiveX controls marked safe for scripting' settings.Affected if ActiveX controls are enabled or set to Prompt for the relevant security zone (Internet/Local Intranet), allowing the vulnerable component to execute.
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Confirm vulnerability trigger conditionThe vulnerability requires the KeyFrame method of the DirectAnimation.PathControl object to be called with maliciously crafted arguments. This typically occurs when visiting a malicious webpage that instantiates the control and calls the method.Affected if A user with IE 6.0 SP1, the DirectAnimation component present, and ActiveX enabled visits a webpage that exploits the KeyFrame method.
A user is affected if they have Internet Explorer 6.0 SP1 with the DirectAnimation.PathControl COM component (daxctle.ocx) present and ActiveX controls enabled, making the KeyFrame method accessible to web pages.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataDisable the vulnerable DirectAnimation COM component via registry or upgrade from Internet Explorer 6.0 SP1 to a supported browser version; apply any available Microsoft patches for this component.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-4777 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sources- secunia.com
- www.vupen.com
- securityreason.com
- securitytracker.com
- www.kb.cert.org
- www.microsoft.com
- www.osvdb.org
- www.securityfocus.com
- www.securityfocus.com
- www.securityfocus.com
- www.securityfocus.com
- www.securityfocus.com
- www.securityfocus.com
- www.us-cert.gov
- www.xsec.org
- docs.microsoft.com
- exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com
- oval.cisecurity.org
- nvd.nist.gov
Practitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-4777 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data