MoodleCMS
CVE-2006-4939
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedbackup/backup_scheduled.php in Moodle before 1.6.2 generates trace data with the full backup pathname even when debugging is disabled, which might allow attackers to obtain the pathname.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe backup_scheduled.php file in Moodle versions prior to 1.6.2 leaks the full file system path in trace output even when debugging is disabled, allowing unauthenticated attackers to potentially discover internal directory structures.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
MoodleCMS
<= 1.6.1= 1.6.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Moodle versionLocate the version.php file in your Moodle installation root directory and read the $release or $version variable, or access the admin page to view version informationAffected if The version is 1.6.0, 1.6.1, or any version prior to 1.6.2 (versions <= 1.6.1)
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Verify backup_scheduled.php existsCheck for the presence of the file backup_scheduled.php in the root directory of your Moodle installationAffected if The file exists in the Moodle web root directory
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Confirm backup scheduled functionality is enabledNavigate to Moodle admin settings and check if the scheduled backup feature is enabled, or inspect the config.php file for $CFG->backup_scheduled variable set to trueAffected if The scheduled backup functionality is enabled in the Moodle configuration
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Test for path disclosure vulnerabilityMake an unauthenticated HTTP request to backup_scheduled.php (e.g., curl http://your-moodle-host/backup_scheduled.php) and examine the response for any file system paths in error messages or trace outputAffected if The response contains full file system paths (such as /var/www or C:\inetpub) regardless of whether debugging is enabled or disabled
The environment is affected if Moodle version is 1.6.0 or 1.6.1, the backup_scheduled.php file is present, and accessing it discloses the server's full file system path.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade to Moodle 1.6.2 or later to patch this path disclosure vulnerability, or disable the backup scheduled functionality if upgrade is not feasible.
Fix this in Moodle
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-4939 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-4939 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data