CVE-2006-4983
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco NAC allows quarantined devices to communicate over the network with (1) DNS, (2) DHCP, and (3) EAPoUDP, which allows attackers to bypass control methods by tunneling network traffic through one of these protocols.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCisco NAC (Network Access Control) was found to improperly allow quarantined devices to continue communicating over the network using DNS, DHCP, and EAPoUDP protocols. This design flaw allowed attackers to bypass NAC quarantine controls by tunneling malicious traffic through these typically trusted protocols, effectively circumventing the security posture enforcement intended by NAC.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Cisco NAC deploymentReview network infrastructure documentation or check for Cisco NAC appliances/controllers on the network. Look for NAC servers, agents, or inline enforcement devices.Affected if Cisco Network Access Control is implemented in the environment
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Identify quarantine VLAN configurationCheck the VLAN assignment for devices flagged as quarantined or non-compliant. In NAC admin console, locate the quarantine policy/VLAN settings.Affected if A separate quarantine VLAN or policy exists for non-compliant devices
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Verify DNS traffic filtering from quarantineFrom a quarantined device or test system in the quarantine VLAN, attempt to resolve external DNS queries or capture traffic to confirm if UDP port 53 to external DNS servers is allowed.Affected if DNS queries to external resolvers succeed from quarantine zone
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Verify DHCP traffic handling in quarantineCheck if DHCP requests from quarantine VLAN can reach external DHCP servers, or if relay agents forward DHCP to external infrastructure.Affected if DHCP traffic from quarantine can reach servers outside the isolated network
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Check EAPoUDP protocol restrictionsExamine firewall or access control rules between quarantine VLAN and trusted networks. Determine if UDP port 2552555 (EAPoUDP) is permitted to flow from quarantined devices to non-NAC infrastructure.Affected if EAPoUDP protocol is allowed beyond NAC enforcement points to external networks
The environment is affected if Cisco NAC is deployed and any of DNS, DHCP, or EAPoUDP protocols are permitted to pass from quarantine zones to external or trusted networks without explicit blocking.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataOrganizations should implement additional network segmentation and firewall rules to explicitly block DNS, DHCP, and EAPoUDP traffic from quarantined VLANs, or migrate to updated NAC solutions that properly restrict all traffic from non-compliant devices.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-4983 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-4983 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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