Secure DesktopApplication · Cisco
CVE-2006-5393
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco Secure Desktop (CSD) does not require that the ClearPageFileAtShutdown (aka CCE-Winv2.0-407) registry value equals 1, which might allow local users to read certain memory pages that were written during another user's SSL VPN session.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCisco Secure Desktop (CSD) does not enforce the ClearPageFileAtShutdown Windows registry setting (CCE-Winv2.0-407) to value 1, which controls whether the pagefile is cleared on system shutdown. When this setting is disabled or not set, memory pages containing sensitive data from previous SSL VPN sessions may persist in the pagefile and be readable by local users who gain access to the system.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Secure DesktopApplication
all versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if Cisco Secure Desktop is installedLook for the CSD installation directory (typically C:\Program Files\Cisco\Cisco Secure Desktop or C:\Program Files (x86)\Cisco\Cisco Secure Desktop) or check for CSD service entry in Windows ServicesAffected if Cisco Secure Desktop software is present on the system
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Verify the ClearPageFileAtShutdown registry settingOpen Registry Editor and navigate to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\, or run 'reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management" /v ClearPageFileAtShutdown'Affected if The ClearPageFileAtShutdown value is missing, set to 0, or does not exist in the registry
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Confirm Group Policy is not enforcing the settingRun 'gpresult /r' to check applied Group Policy objects, then verify if a policy is setting ClearPageFileAtShutdown to 1 under Computer Configuration/Windows Settings/Security Settings/Local Policies/Security Options or through a domain GPOAffected if No Group Policy is applying ClearPageFileAtShutdown = 1 and the registry value is not set to 1
If Cisco Secure Desktop is installed and ClearPageFileAtShutdown is not set to 1 in the registry or via Group Policy, the system is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataConfigure the Windows registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\ClearPageFileAtShutdown to 1, or deploy this setting via Group Policy to ensure pagefile clearing occurs on shutdown after each SSL VPN session.
Fix this in Secure Desktop
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-5393 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-5393 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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