CVE-2006-5737
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPunBB uses a predictable cookie_seed value that can be derived from the time of registration of the superadmin account (installation time), which might allow local users to perform unauthorized actions.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidencePunBB forum software generates a cookie_seed value used for session authentication that is predictable because it derives from the timestamp of the superadmin account registration (installation time). Local attackers who can determine this timestamp can compute the cookie_seed and forge valid authentication cookies to perform unauthorized administrative actions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.2.14CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm PunBB installation versionLocate and read the version file or header in the PunBB installation directory (typically version.php or similar file containing '1.2.14' or check the admin dashboard for version display)Affected if Installed version is exactly 1.2.14
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Locate cookie_seed configurationSearch the PunBB configuration file (usually config.php) for the 'cookie_seed' setting and note its valueAffected if cookie_seed exists and is a numeric value derived from a timestamp
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Examine cookie_seed generation codeReview the install.php or admin script that creates the initial admin account, looking for code that generates cookie_seed from time() or similar timestamp functionAffected if Code shows cookie_seed is generated using time() or unix timestamp
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Check admin registration timestamp exposureQuery the database users table for the 'registered' field of the admin account (user_id = 1), or inspect public user profile pages if registration date is visibleAffected if Admin account registration timestamp is discoverable (publicly visible or obtainable through user enumeration)
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Verify cookie generation uses predictable seedLocate the authentication cookie generation function (typically in include/functions.php or similar) and trace how cookie_seed is used to construct authentication tokensAffected if Authentication cookies are computed using the timestamp-derived cookie_seed without additional randomization
User is affected if running PunBB 1.2.14 where the cookie_seed is generated from the admin account registration timestamp and that timestamp is discoverable, allowing cookie forgery.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace the predictable timestamp-based seed generation with cryptographically secure random number generation (e.g., using random_bytes() or equivalent CSPRNG) for all cookie and session tokens.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,088.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-5737 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-5737 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data