CVE-2006-6679
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedPedro Lineu Orso chetcpasswd before 2.4 relies on the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header when verifying a client's status on an IP address ACL, which allows remote attackers to gain unauthorized access by spoofing this header.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe chetcpasswd application before version 2.4 trusts the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header when determining client IP addresses for IP-based access control lists. Since this header can be trivially spoofed by an attacker via HTTP request manipulation, remote attackers can bypass IP ACL restrictions and gain unauthorized access.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 2.4CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if chetcpasswd is installedLocate the chetcpasswd application binary or check package managers for the chetcpasswd package. Common locations: /usr/bin/chetcpasswd, /usr/local/bin/chetcpasswd, or search for 'chetcpasswd' in the system.Affected if chetcpasswd is found on the system and is in use for password management.
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Determine the installed version of chetcpasswdRun 'chetcpasswd --version' or check the package version via package manager (dpkg -l chetcpasswd, rpm -qi chetcpasswd). Compare the version number against the vulnerable range: versions prior to 2.4.Affected if The installed version is less than 2.4.
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Verify if IP-based access control is configuredExamine the chetcpasswd configuration file (typically chetcpasswd.conf or similar in /etc or the application config directory) for ACL or IP restriction settings. Look for directives related to IP access control, allowed IPs, or deny rules.Affected if IP-based access control or ACL rules are defined in the configuration.
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Check if the application is exposed to untrusted clientsReview the deployment setup to determine if chetcpasswd is accessible directly to clients or over the internet. Verify if there is a reverse proxy or load balancer in front that could set or be spoofed for the X-Forwarded-For header.Affected if The application is accessible to clients who can manipulate HTTP headers.
A user is affected if chetcpasswd version is below 2.4 AND IP-based access control is configured AND the application accepts client-supplied HTTP headers for access decisions instead of the actual TCP source IP.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor data2.4
Upgrade to chetcpasswd version 2.4 or later which addresses this vulnerability, or modify the application to use the actual source IP address from the TCP connection rather than trusting client-supplied HTTP headers for access control decisions.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2006-6679 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2006-6679 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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