iOSOperating system · Cisco
CVE-2007-0918
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe ATOMIC.TCP signature engine in the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) feature for Cisco IOS 12.4XA, 12.3YA, 12.3T, and other trains allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (IPS crash and traffic loss) via unspecified manipulations that are not properly handled by the regular expression feature, as demonstrated using the 3123.0 (Netbus Pro Traffic) signature.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceA denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the ATOMIC.TCP signature engine of Cisco IOS IPS (Intrusion Prevention System). The vulnerability is triggered when the regular expression feature processes specially crafted network traffic (specifically demonstrated with Netbus Pro Traffic signature 3123.0), causing the IPS to crash and resulting in traffic loss.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
iOSOperating system
= 12.3t= 12.3xq= 12.3xr= 12.3xs= 12.3xw= 12.3xx= 12.3xy= 12.3ya= 12.3yd= 12.3yg= 12.3yh= 12.3yiCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify Cisco IOS IPS is enabledExecute 'show ip ips signature count' or 'show ips status' to confirm the IPS subsystem is active on the deviceAffected if IPS is not running or not configured, the device is not vulnerable to this specific flaw
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Confirm the IOS version matches affected releasesExecute 'show version' and check the IOS version against the affected list: 12.3t, 12.3xq, 12.3xr, 12.3xs, 12.3xw, 12.3xx, 12.3xy, 12.3ya, 12.3yd, 12.3yg, 12.3yh, 12.3yiAffected if The IOS version exactly matches one of these versions, the device falls within the affected set
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Identify if signature 3123.0 (Netbus Pro Traffic) is loadedExecute 'show ip ips signature 3123' or 'show ip ips signature | include 3123' to check if the vulnerable Netbus Pro Traffic signature is present in the active signature setAffected if Signature 3123.0 is loaded and active, the specific trigger for this vulnerability exists on the device
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Confirm the ATOMIC.TCP signature engine is activeExecute 'show ip ips signature engine' and verify the ATOMIC.TCP engine is loaded and processing signaturesAffected if The ATOMIC.TCP engine is active, the vulnerable code path is available to be exploited
The device is affected if it runs one of the listed IOS versions, has IPS enabled with the ATOMIC.TCP engine active, and has signature 3123.0 loaded in the signature set.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Cisco IOS to a version that addresses this vulnerability or update IPS signature definitions to remove/filter the problematic signature pattern while awaiting a full IOS upgrade.
Fix this in iOS
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,544.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-0918 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-0918 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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