CVE-2007-1747
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnspecified vulnerability in MSO.dll in Microsoft Office 2000 SP3, 2002 SP3, 2003 SP2, 2004 for Mac, and 2007 allows user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a malformed drawing object, which triggers memory corruption.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMemory corruption vulnerability in MSO.dll allows remote code execution through malformed drawing objects in Microsoft Office documents. User-assisted attack requires victim to open specially crafted Office file, triggering heap corruption that can enable arbitrary code execution with user privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2000= 2003= 2004= 2007= xpCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed Microsoft Office versionOpen Control Panel > Programs and Features, locate Microsoft Office entry and note the version (2000, XP, 2003, 2004, or 2007)Affected if Installed version is 2000, XP, 2003, 2004, or 2007
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Locate MSO.dll on the systemSearch for MSO.dll in typical Office installation paths: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\ (Office 2000/2003/2007) or C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office XP\ (Office XP). Also check %WINDIR%\System32 for older versions.Affected if MSO.dll exists in an Office installation directory
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Check MSO.dll file versionRight-click MSO.dll > Properties > Details tab, note the File Version field. Compare against known vulnerable versions or check if security updates have been applied.Affected if File version corresponds to an unpatched Office 2000/2003/2004/2007/XP installation
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Determine if Office documents are processedReview whether users in the environment routinely open Word, Excel, or PowerPoint documents from any source. Check email gateways, file shares, or download folders for Office files.Affected if Users regularly open Office documents, enabling the attack vector
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Verify security update statusCheck Windows Update history or the installed updates list for security updates released after May 2007 (Microsoft MS07-025 or subsequent Office security bulletins). Alternatively, check Microsoft Update for available Office security patches.Affected if No post-May-2007 security updates for Office have been installed
The system is affected if it runs an unpatched Office 2000, XP, 2003, 2004, or 2007 installation with MSO.dll present and users open Office documents.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply Microsoft security updates for affected Office versions. Until patched, instruct users not to open Office documents from untrusted sources and consider disabling active content/DDE in Office Trust Center settings.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-1747 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-1747 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data