CVE-2007-1987
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple PHP remote file inclusion vulnerabilities in PHPEcho CMS 2.0 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the (1) _plugin_file parameter to smarty/internals/core.load_pulgins.php or the (2) root_path parameter to index.php. NOTE: CVE disputes (1) because the inclusion occurs within a function that is not called during a direct request. CVE disputes (2) because root_path is defined in config.php before use
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidencePHPEcho CMS 2.0 contains alleged remote file inclusion vulnerabilities through the _plugin_file parameter in smarty/internals/core.load_pulgins.php and the root_path parameter in index.php. However, the CVE note disputes both vectors: the first because the inclusion occurs within a function not called during direct requests, and the second because root_path is pre-defined in config.php before index.php uses it, preventing attacker control.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm PHPEcho CMS 2.0 installationSearch for index.php or config.php files that contain 'PHPEcho' or 'phpecho' identifiers in the web root directoryAffected if The PHPEcho CMS 2.0 application is found running on the server
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Verify the smarty plugin file existsLocate the file smarty/internals/core.load_plugins.php in the installation directoryAffected if The file smarty/internals/core.load_plugins.php exists in the CMS directory
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Check root_path configuration in config.phpOpen config.php and locate the line where $root_path is defined, verify it is set to a static value before index.php includes itAffected if The $root_path variable is NOT defined as an empty or user-controllable value at the top of config.php (the CVE disputes exploitation if it is pre-defined)
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Inspect the core.load_plugins.php inclusion logicExamine the core.load_plugins.php file and locate the include/require statement using the _plugin_file parameter within any function definitionAffected if The include statement using _plugin_file is located inside a function that IS called during normal page execution (the CVE disputes exploitation if it is in an uncalled function)
The environment is affected only if PHPEcho CMS 2.0 is installed AND the root_path variable is empty/controllable in config.php, OR the _plugin_file inclusion in core.load_plugins.php is in a function that gets invoked during normal requests.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataGiven the CVE disputes and the 2007 disclosure date, the primary remediation is to upgrade to a supported CMS version or remove legacy PHPEcho installations. If continued use is required, conduct code review to verify the disputed claims and ensure root_path cannot be overridden.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-1987 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-1987 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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