CVE-2007-3321
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe Avaya 4602 SW IP Phone (Model 4602D02A) with 2.2.2 and earlier SIP firmware allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device reboot) via a flood of packets to the BOOTP port (68/udp).
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Avaya 4602 SW IP Phone (Model 4602D02A) with SIP firmware version 2.2.2 and earlier contains a denial of service vulnerability where a flood of UDP packets to port 68 (BOOTP) causes the device to reboot, rendering the phone unavailable.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= r2.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLocate the physical phone or check network inventory for Avaya 4602 SW IP Phone (model 4602D02A)Affected if The device is not an Avaya 4602 SW IP Phone, the check does not apply
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Check the SIP firmware versionAccess the phone's web interface or admin menu and locate the firmware version information, typically under 'Status' or 'Software Version'Affected if Firmware version is r2.2 or earlier, or version 2.2.2 or earlier
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Verify UDP port 68 accessibilityFrom a network host, run 'nc -zvu <phone_ip> 68' or use nmap to check if UDP port 68 is open and reachableAffected if UDP port 68 responds to external traffic or shows as open/filtered
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Check BOOTP client configurationAccess the phone's admin interface and verify if BOOTP/DHCP client is enabled in the network settingsAffected if BOOTP client is enabled and the phone requests IP configuration via BOOTP on port 68
User is affected if they have an Avaya 4602 SW IP Phone running firmware r2.2 or earlier with UDP port 68 accessible on the network.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement network-level controls such as firewall rules or rate-limiting on UDP port 68 to restrict BOOTP traffic, or upgrade to a patched firmware version if available.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,984.
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-3321 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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