CVE-2007-3347
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe D-Link DPH-540/DPH-541 phone accepts SIP INVITE messages that are not from the Call Server's IP address, which allows remote attackers to engage in arbitrary SIP communication with the phone, as demonstrated by communication with forged caller ID.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe D-Link DPH-540/DPH-541 VoIP phone fails to validate the source IP address of incoming SIP INVITE messages, accepting any INVITE regardless of origin. This allows remote attackers to send spoofed SIP messages directly to the phone, enabling arbitrary SIP communication with forged caller ID without authentication.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.00.03= 1.00.14= 1.00.03= 1.00.14CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:C/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the device modelLocate the device label or check the web management interface for the exact model number (DPH-540 or DPH-541)Affected if The device is a D-Link DPH-540 or DPH-541 phone
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Check the firmware versionAccess the phone's web interface or status menu and locate the firmware version informationAffected if The firmware version is 1.00.03 or 1.00.14
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Verify SIP functionality is enabledCheck the phone's SIP configuration settings in the web interface to confirm SIP is configured and activeAffected if SIP is enabled and the phone is configured to receive calls
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Test source IP validation (optional manual test)Send a SIP INVITE packet from an IP address that is not your legitimate Call Server and observe if the phone accepts and processes the callAffected if The phone accepts and attempts to process the INVITE from an unauthorized source
You are affected if you have a D-Link DPH-540 or DPH-541 running firmware version 1.00.03 or 1.00.14 with SIP enabled, and the phone accepts SIP INVITE messages from any source IP address.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement network-level controls to restrict SIP traffic to only the legitimate Call Server's IP address, or deploy a SIP proxy/firewall that enforces source IP validation before traffic reaches the phone.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,120.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-3347 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-3347 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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