CVE-2007-5330
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe cadbd RPC service in CA BrightStor ARCServe BackUp v9.01 through R11.5, and Enterprise Backup r10.5, allows remote attackers to (1) execute arbitrary code via stack-based buffer overflows in unspecified RPC procedures, and (2) trigger memory corruption related to the use of "handle" RPC arguments as pointers.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysisThe program reads or writes outside the bounds of an allocated buffer, corrupting adjacent memory. With crafted input an attacker can overwrite control data and, with effort, redirect execution to their own code. Remediation ranges from bounds checking and safe library functions to compiler mitigations, usually alongside a careful audit of the surrounding code.
General guidance for the memory buffer bounds error class — the official description and references above are authoritative for this specific CVE. Want a bespoke review and a reviewed fix? Ask our team →
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 9.01= 10.5= 11= 11.1= 11.5= 10.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedCA ARCserve Backup r11.5 or later, or migrate to a currently supported backup solution
- 1. Access the Secunia research advisory at http://secunia.com/secunia_research/2007-62/advisory/ to obtain the vendor patch for CVE-2007-5330
- 2. Review the specific patch requirements for your version of CA BrightStor ARCServe Backup (v9.01, 10.5, 11, or 11.1) or BrightStor Enterprise Backup v10.5
- 3. Apply the vendor-provided patch to all affected systems
- 4. After patching, verify the cadbd RPC service is no longer exposed to untrusted networks
- 5. If no patch is available from the vendor (CA/Broadcom), consider disabling the cadbd RPC service or implementing network segmentation to restrict access to port 4155
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-5330 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-5330 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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