Call ManagerHardware / appliance · Cisco
CVE-2007-5468
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco CallManager 5.1.1.3000-5 does not verify the Digest authentication header URI against the Request URI in SIP messages, which allows remote attackers to use sniffed Digest authentication credentials to call arbitrary telephone numbers or spoof caller ID (aka "toll fraud and authentication forward attack").
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceCisco CallManager 5.1.1.3000-5 fails to validate that the URI in the Digest authentication header matches the Request URI in incoming SIP messages. This allows an attacker who has intercepted Digest authentication credentials to reuse them in crafted SIP requests, enabling toll fraud (making unauthorized calls to arbitrary telephone numbers) and caller ID spoofing.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Call ManagerHardware / appliance
= 5.1.1.3000CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Cisco CallManager installationCheck system inventory or run 'show version' on the Cisco device to confirm it is a Cisco CallManager systemAffected if System is not a Cisco CallManager (not affected)
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Verify the CallManager versionAccess the Cisco CallManager Administration interface (Cisco CallManager Serviceability) or use the 'utils system version' CLI command to determine the exact version numberAffected if Version is NOT exactly 5.1.1.3000 (not affected)
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Confirm SIP is enabledIn Cisco CallManager Administration, go to System > Device Pool or System > Service Parameters and check if SIP is configured as an enabled protocol for device registration or trunkingAffected if SIP protocol is not enabled or configured (not affected)
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Check SIP Digest authentication configurationIn CallManager Administration, examine SIP Trunk security settings under Device > Trunk or examine the SIP digest authentication configuration for enabled devicesAffected if SIP Digest authentication is not in use (likely not affected, though the flawed code may still exist)
A system is affected only if it is exactly Cisco CallManager version 5.1.1.3000 with SIP protocol and Digest authentication enabled, as the vulnerability allows replay of stolen credentials for unauthorized calls.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply the vendor patch or upgrade to a Cisco CallManager version that implements proper URI validation in SIP Digest authentication. Until then, monitor SIP traffic for anomalous authentication patterns and consider network segmentation to limit exposure of SIP infrastructure.
Fix this in Call Manager
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $6,176.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-5468 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-5468 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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