CVE-2007-5734
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in eFileMan 7.1.0.87-88 allows remote attackers to upload arbitrary files, with "uploads/upload_file." destination filenames, via unspecified vectors to upload.cgi, accessed from upload.html.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in eFileMan 7.1.0.87-88 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to upload arbitrary files to the web server via the upload.cgi script, with files saved to predictable 'uploads/upload_file.' filenames. This can lead to remote code execution if executable files (e.g., web shells) are uploaded.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 7.1.0.87_88CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify eFileMan installationCheck if the eFileMan web interface is accessible in your environment by accessing the application's URL and confirming the eFileMan application is running.Affected if eFileMan is exposed and accessible on the network
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Confirm eFileMan versionLocate the installed version of eFileMan, typically visible in the application header, about page, or HTTP server banner, and compare it to the affected range 7.1.0.87-88.Affected if The installed version is 7.1.0.87 or 7.1.0.88
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Verify upload.cgi script existsAttempt to access the upload.cgi script at the expected path within the eFileMan web directory (such as /cgi-bin/upload.cgi or similar).Affected if The upload.cgi script responds or returns a valid HTTP response, indicating it is present and accessible.
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Check uploads directory accessibilityAttempt to access the uploads directory via HTTP (e.g., /uploads/) to determine if it is web-accessible and if uploaded files can be reached.Affected if The uploads directory is accessible via the web and files can be retrieved.
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Test upload functionality without authenticationSend a POST request to upload.cgi with a test file (such as a text file) without providing any authentication credentials, to verify if unauthenticated uploads are permitted.Affected if Files can be uploaded without authentication and are saved to predictable locations.
A user is affected if eFileMan version 7.1.0.87 or 7.1.0.88 is installed and the upload.cgi script is accessible without authentication, allowing arbitrary file uploads to a web-accessible directory.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict file uploads by validating file types/extensions server-side, rename uploaded files with random identifiers, store uploads outside the web root or with non-executable extensions, and implement authentication for the upload functionality.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-5734 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-5734 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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