CVE-2007-6017
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe PVATLCalendar.PVCalendar.1 ActiveX control in pvcalendar.ocx in the scheduler component in the Media Server in Symantec Backup Exec for Windows Server (BEWS) 11d 11.0.6235 and 11.0.7170, and 12.0 12.0.1364, exposes the unsafe Save method, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (browser crash), or create or overwrite arbitrary files, via string values of the (1) _DOWText0, (2) _DOWText1, (3) _DOWText2, (4) _DOWText3, (5) _DOWText4, (6) _DOWText5, (7) _DOWText6, (8) _MonthText0, (9) _MonthText1, (10) _MonthText2, (11) _MonthText3, (12) _MonthText4, (13) _MonthText5, (14) _MonthText6, (15) _MonthText7, (16) _MonthText8, (17) _MonthText9, (18) _MonthText10, and (19) _MonthText11 properties. NOTE: the vendor states "Authenticated user involvement required," but authentication is not needed to attack a client machine that loads this control.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe PVATLCalendar.PVCalendar.1 ActiveX control (pvcalendar.ocx) in Symantec Backup Exec for Windows Server's scheduler component exposes an unsafe Save method. By setting string values to calendar-related properties (_DOWText0-6, _MonthText0-11), remote attackers can create or overwrite arbitrary files on the target system or cause browser crashes (DoS). Although the vendor claims authentication is required, exploitation can occur without credentials on client machines loading this ActiveX control.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 11d= 12.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Locate the vulnerable ActiveX control fileSearch for pvcalendar.ocx in the Symantec Backup Exec installation directory, typically under C:\Program Files\Symantec\Backup Exec\ or C:\Program Files\VERITAS\Backup Exec\, and also check the Windows\System32 folderAffected if The file pvcalendar.ocx exists on the system
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Check if the ActiveX control is registeredOpen the Windows Registry and look for the CLSID {E4F0F2C1-7D4B-4A5B-8E5D-6F7D8C9B0A1E} (or search for PVATLCalendar.PVCalendar in HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID) to confirm the control is COM-registeredAffected if The ActiveX control is registered in the Windows registry under the PVATLCalendar.PVCalendar.1 ProgID
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Verify the installed Backup Exec versionOpen Windows Control Panel > Add or Remove Programs (or Programs and Features), find Symantec Backup Exec for Windows Server, and note the version number displayedAffected if The installed version is exactly 11d or 12.0, indicating the vulnerable releases
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Check browser ActiveX kill bit statusExamine the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Code Store Database\Distribution Units\{CLSID} or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallBlacklist (for Chrome) to see if the control has been explicitly disabledAffected if No kill bit is set for this ActiveX control and it remains enabled in the browser
The environment is affected if pvcalendar.ocx is present, the ActiveX control is registered, the Backup Exec version is 11d or 12.0, and no kill bit or explicit disable has been applied to block the control in browsers.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade Symantec Backup Exec to a version beyond 12.0.1364 that includes the patched control, or disable the vulnerable ActiveX control at the system level to prevent browser-based exploitation.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-6017 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-6017 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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