CVE-2007-6291
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedSQL injection vulnerability in abm.aspx in Xigla Absolute Banner Manager .NET 4.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the z parameter.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceSQL injection vulnerability in the abm.aspx page of Xigla Absolute Banner Manager .NET 4.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the z parameter. The vulnerability is exploitable without authentication due to unsanitized user input being directly concatenated into SQL queries.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 4.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify if Xigla Absolute Banner Manager.NET is installedSearch for the application in your web server's webroot directories or check installed web applications for references to 'abm.aspx' or 'Absolute Banner Manager'Affected if The application is found on the server
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Determine the installed versionCheck the assembly version, readme, or version file within the application's directory, or look for version information in the application's about page or configuration filesAffected if The version is 4.0 exactly
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Verify the vulnerable page existsLocate the abm.aspx file within the application's web directory structureAffected if The abm.aspx file exists in the application path
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Confirm the application is accessible over the networkAttempt to access the abm.aspx page via HTTP/HTTPS using the application's URL (e.g., https://yourserver/path/abm.aspx)Affected if The page responds and accepts parameters
You are affected if Xigla Absolute Banner Manager.NET version 4.0 is installed and the abm.aspx page is accessible, as the unsanitized z parameter can be exploited for SQL injection without authentication.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations, and add input validation for the z parameter. Apply vendor patch if available.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $2,800.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2007-6291 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2007-6291 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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