CVE-2008-0556
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in OpenCA PKI 0.9.2.5, and possibly earlier versions, allows remote attackers to perform unauthorized actions as authorized users via a link or IMG tag to RAServer.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCSRF vulnerability in OpenCA PKI 0.9.2.5's RAServer allows remote attackers to perform unauthorized actions by tricking authenticated users into visiting malicious links or loading img tags that trigger state-changing requests to the RA server.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 0.9.2.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify OpenCA PKI versionLocate the OpenCA PKI installation directory and check version files such as VERSION, README, or the package metadata. Common paths include /usr/local/openca/ or /opt/openca/. The version may also be displayed in the web interface footer or in the output of command-line tools like 'opensa-ca' with version flags.Affected if The installed version is 0.9.2.5 or any earlier version (e.g., 0.9.2.4, 0.9.2.3, etc.)
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Confirm RAServer component is deployedCheck for the presence of the RAServer (RA Server) web application in the web server configuration. Look for Apache or other web server configuration files that map to the RA server, typically under paths like /ra/ or /raserver. Verify the CGI or mod_perl scripts for RAServer exist in the web root.Affected if The RAServer component is accessible and actively running as part of the OpenCA PKI installation.
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Inspect state-changing forms for anti-CSRF tokensAccess the RAServer web interface and log in as a valid user. Navigate to forms that perform state-changing operations such as certificate requests, user management, or approval workflows. View the page source (HTML) of these forms and check whether they contain hidden input fields with random token values (e.g., name like 'csrf_token', 'token', or 'session_token') that get submitted with the form.Affected if Forms handling state-changing operations lack anti-CSRF token fields, leaving them vulnerable to CSRF attacks.
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Check request header validation configurationExamine the RAServer configuration files and application code for validation of Origin or Referer HTTP headers on state-changing POST requests. Look for code patterns that check $ENV{HTTP_ORIGIN}, $ENV{HTTP_REFERER}, or equivalent server-side validation logic. Also check web server configuration for any header-based access controls.Affected if The RAServer does not validate Origin or Referer headers on state-changing requests, allowing attackers to forge requests from malicious domains.
A user is affected if OpenCA PKI version 0.9.2.5 or earlier is installed with the RAServer component exposed, and the application lacks anti-CSRF tokens and Origin/Referer header validation on state-changing operations.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement anti-CSRF tokens (synchronizer token pattern) on all state-changing operations and validate request Origin/Referer headers to prevent cross-site request forgery attacks.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA3.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $7,040.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-0556 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-0556 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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