CVE-2008-1250
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the web interface on the central phone server for the Snom 320 SIP Phone allow remote attackers to perform actions as the phone user, as demonstrated by inserting an address-book entry containing an XSS sequence.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the web interface of the Snom 320 SIP Phone allow remote attackers to trick authenticated users into performing unintended actions, such as injecting XSS payloads through address-book entries.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Snom 320 devices on your networkScan your network for devices with the Snom 320 SIP Phone web interface. Access the device admin page by entering the phone's IP address in a browser. Look for the Snom 320 login page or check the device firmware version page for confirmation.Affected if The device is a Snom 320 SIP Phone and the web interface is accessible on the network.
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Verify the web interface is enabled and accessibleConfirm the web interface responds by accessing http://[device-ip] or https://[device-ip]. The Snom 320 web interface should present a login page or admin panel.Affected if The web interface is accessible without additional network restrictions.
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Check for CSRF protection in web formsLog into the web interface and navigate to forms that modify device settings (such as the address-book or settings pages). View the page source or intercept requests to examine if anti-CSRF tokens or unique request identifiers are included in forms.Affected if Forms lack anti-CSRF tokens or unique request validation, allowing attackers to forge requests on behalf of authenticated users.
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Verify address-book input is not protected against XSS injectionWhile authenticated, access the address-book functionality and attempt to inject HTML or script tags into contact fields (such as name or phone number fields). Submit the form and check if the input is reflected back without sanitization.Affected if Address-book entries accept and reflect unsanitized input, indicating the XSS injection vector described in the CVE is present.
If you have accessible Snom 320 SIP Phones with an unprotected web interface lacking CSRF tokens, and the address-book feature accepts unsanitized input, your environment is affected by this CVE.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataApply vendor firmware updates if available; otherwise implement compensating controls such as network segmentation to limit exposure of the phone's web interface to untrusted networks.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-1250 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-1250 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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