CVE-2008-2431
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple buffer overflows in Novell iPrint Client before 5.06 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by calling the Novell iPrint ActiveX control (aka ienipp.ocx) with (1) a long third argument to the GetDriverFile method; a long first argument to the (2) GetPrinterURLList or (3) GetPrinterURLList2 method; (4) a long argument to the GetFileList method; a long argument to the (5) GetServerVersion, (6) GetResourceList, or (7) DeleteResource method, related to nipplib.dll; a long uploadPath argument to the (8) UploadPrinterDriver or (9) UploadResource method, related to URIs; (10) a long seventh argument to the UploadResource method; a long string in the (11) second, (12) third, or (13) fourth argument to the GetDriverSettings method, related to the IppGetDriverSettings function in nipplib.dll; or (14) a long eighth argument to the UploadResourceToRMS method.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceNovell iPrint Client versions prior to 5.06 contain multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the ienipp.ocx ActiveX control and nipplib.dll library. Attackers can achieve remote code execution by passing excessively long string arguments to various methods including GetDriverFile, GetPrinterURLList, GetPrinterURLList2, GetFileList, GetServerVersion, GetResourceList, DeleteResource, UploadPrinterDriver, UploadResource, GetDriverSettings, and UploadResourceToRMS. The lack of proper bounds checking on user-supplied input to these methods allows heap/stack-based buffer overflows leading to arbitrary code execution.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 5.04= 4.26= 4.27= 4.28= 4.30= 4.32= 4.34= 4.36= 4.38CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Check if Novell iPrint Client is installedOpen Windows Control Panel > Programs and Features (or Run: appwiz.cpl), look for 'Novell iPrint Client' in the installed programs listAffected if Novell iPrint Client is not present in the program list (not vulnerable as it's not installed)
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Find the installed iPrint Client versionIf installed, right-click on Novell iPrint Client in Programs and Features and select 'Change' or 'Properties', or check the version in the registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Novell\iPrint (key: Version)Affected if The version displayed is 5.04 or lower, or matches any of these: 4.26, 4.27, 4.28, 4.30, 4.32, 4.34, 4.36, or 4.38
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Locate the ienipp.ocx ActiveX control fileSearch for ienipp.ocx in the Windows system directory (typically C:\Windows\System32\) or in the Novell iPrint installation directory (commonly C:\Program Files\Novell\iPrint\)Affected if The file ienipp.ocx exists on the system, confirming the vulnerable ActiveX component is present
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Verify the ActiveX control is registeredOpen Command Prompt and run: regsvr32 /s ienipp.ocx (to register) or check registry under HKCR\CLSID\ for the control's CLSID (search for 'iPrint' in HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\{CLSID})Affected if The ienipp.ocx control is registered and loadable by Internet Explorer or other applications
If Novell iPrint Client is installed and its version is 5.04 or lower, or matches any of 4.26/4.27/4.28/4.30/4.32/4.34/4.36/4.38, the system is vulnerable to the buffer overflow in the ienipp.ocx ActiveX control.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedUpgrade Novell iPrint Client to version 5.06 or later. As an interim measure, disable the ienipp.ocx ActiveX control in Internet Explorer or restrict access to systems running the vulnerable iPrint Client.
Novell iPrint Client 5.06 or later
- 1. Identify all systems with Novell iPrint Client installed.
- 2. Verify current version of Novell iPrint Client by checking the ienipp.ocx ActiveX control or the installed iPrint software.
- 3. Download Novell iPrint Client version 5.06 or later from the official Novell/NetIQ support website.
- 4. Uninstall the current version of Novell iPrint Client from affected systems.
- 5. Install the updated Novell iPrint Client version 5.06 or newer on all previously affected systems.
- 6. Verify the installation was successful and confirm the version is now 5.06 or later.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-2431 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-2431 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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