CVE-2008-3232
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in ecrire/images.php in Dotclear 1.2.7.1 and earlier allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code by uploading a file with an executable extension, then accessing it via a direct request to the file in images.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in ecrire/images.php in Dotclear 1.2.7.1 and earlier allows remote authenticated users to upload files with executable extensions (e.g., .php, .phtml) to the images directory, then execute arbitrary code by directly requesting the uploaded file.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data<= 1.2.7= 1.2.1= 1.2.2= 1.2.3= 1.2.4= 1.2.5= 1.2.6CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Dotclear installation and versionLocate the Dotclear installation directory and check for a version file or meta information. Common paths include the root web directory. Look for a version.php, about.php, or similar file that displays the installed Dotclear version.Affected if The installed Dotclear version is 1.2.7.1 or earlier, or matches any of these versions: 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, or 1.2.6.
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Verify ecrire/images.php existsCheck if the file ecrire/images.php exists in the web root or Dotclear installation directory. This is the vulnerable upload handler.Affected if The file ecrire/images.php exists and is accessible via the web server.
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Check if authenticated user upload access is enabledExamine the Dotclear administration panel to determine if the current configuration allows authenticated users (such as authors or editors) to access the file upload functionality in the images section.Affected if Authenticated users have access to the upload feature in the images management area of the admin panel.
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Inspect images directory for script execution capabilityCheck the configuration of the images upload directory (usually images/ or img/) for whether server-side script execution (PHP, phtml) is permitted. Look for .htaccess files or server configuration that may allow or restrict script execution.Affected if The images directory allows execution of .php, .phtml, or other server-side script files.
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Review upload file extension filteringExamine the ecrire/images.php code or any associated configuration to determine what file extensions are allowed during upload. Focus on whether executable extensions like .php or .phtml are blocked or permitted.Affected if The upload mechanism does not restrict executable extensions, allowing .php, .phtml, or similar files to be uploaded.
A user is affected if they are running Dotclear version 1.2.7.1 or earlier (including 1.2.1-1.2.6) with the ecrire/images.php upload handler present, accessible to authenticated users, and the images directory permits script execution.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedImplement strict allowlist-based file extension validation, restrict or disable script execution in upload directories via .htaccess or server configuration, and consider renaming uploaded files to non-executable names.
Dotclear 1.2.8 or later
- 1. Back up your existing Dotclear installation and database before making any changes.
- 2. Download Dotclear version 1.2.8 or later from the official Dotclear repository (https://dotclear.org/).
- 3. Replace the ecrire/images.php file with the new version from the 1.2.8 release.
- 4. Alternatively, if upgrading the entire installation is not feasible, manually modify ecrire/images.php to add proper file type validation before allowing uploads.
- 5. Verify that the fix prevents uploading of executable file extensions (such as .php, .phtml, .php3, .php4, .php5, .phar, .asp, .cgi, .pl, .py, .sh, .exe).
- 6. After applying the fix, test the image upload functionality to ensure legitimate uploads still work.
- 7. Review server configuration to ensure uploaded files in the images directory are not executed as scripts (e.g., disable Script execution via .htaccess for Apache or equivalent web server configuration).
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-3232 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-3232 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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