CVE-2008-3891
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe SAML Single Sign-On (SSO) Service for Google Apps allows remote service providers to impersonate users at arbitrary service providers via vectors related to authentication responses that lack a request identifier and recipient field.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceThe SAML SSO Service for Google Apps fails to validate the InResponseTo attribute (request identifier) and recipient field in authentication responses. This allows an attacker who controls a malicious service provider to craft SAML responses that can be replayed across different service providers, enabling user impersonation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify SAML SSO integration with Google AppsReview your identity provider (IdP) configuration and Google Apps admin console to confirm if SAML-based Single Sign-On is enabled and configured for Google Apps accessAffected if SAML SSO is configured for Google Apps and the IdP does not validate InResponseTo or recipient fields in SAML responses
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Verify IdP sends InResponseTo attributeUse a SAML tracer or browser developer tools to capture a SAML authentication response from your IdP to Google Apps. Inspect the SAML Response XML for the presence of the InResponseTo attribute in the Response elementAffected if The SAML response lacks an InResponseTo attribute or the IdP does not populate it with the original AuthnRequest ID
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Check recipient field validationInspect the SAML response to confirm the Destination attribute matches the expected ACS (Assertion Consumer Service) URL for your Google Apps deploymentAffected if The Destination field is missing, empty, or does not match the correct Google Apps ACS URL for your organization
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Test for response replay across SPsIf you have multiple service providers configured with the same IdP, attempt to use a SAML response intended for one SP to authenticate to another. This requires controlled testing with a test accountAffected if A SAML response from one service provider can be successfully used to authenticate to a different service provider (indicating the response is not bound to the intended recipient)
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Confirm Google Apps version receives updatesContact Google support or check the Google Apps admin release notes for your domain to confirm the domain is on supported, updated Google Apps infrastructureAffected if The Google Apps deployment is on legacy or unsupported infrastructure that may not have received the validation fix
An organization is affected if they use SAML SSO with Google Apps and their IdP does not properly bind responses to specific requests via InResponseTo and recipient validation, allowing potential cross-SP replay attacks.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement proper validation of the InResponseTo attribute to ensure responses are bound to the original request, and add recipient field validation to ensure responses are only accepted by the intended service provider.
- Consultation6.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA4.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $8,928.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-3891 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-3891 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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