CVE-2008-4477
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedalert.d/test.alert in mon 0.99.2 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on the test.alert.log temporary file.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe mon 0.99.2 monitoring software contains a symlink attack vulnerability in alert.d/test.alert where the test.alert.log temporary file is created without proper security checks, allowing local users to trick the script into overwriting arbitrary files by creating a symlink with that name.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 0.99.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify mon installationRun 'mon -V' or 'mon --version' to display the mon version. If not found, check common installation paths like /usr/bin/mon, /usr/local/bin/mon, or use 'which mon' to locate the binary.Affected if The installed version is exactly 0.99.2 (no other versions are listed as affected for this CVE).
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Locate the alert.d directoryFind the mon configuration directory containing alert scripts. Common paths include /etc/mon/alert.d, /usr/lib/mon/alert.d, or check the mon man pages for the default alert directory location.Affected if The alert.d directory and the test.alert script exist in the mon installation.
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Inspect test.alert for vulnerable temporary file creationRead the test.alert file (e.g., 'cat /path/to/alert.d/test.alert') and search for temporary file creation code. Look for patterns like '> test.alert.log' or 'open(..., "> test.alert.log")' without O_EXCL or mkstemp usage.Affected if The script creates a file named test.alert.log without secure temporary file handling (no mkstemp, no O_EXCL flag).
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Verify /tmp permissions and accessibilityCheck /tmp directory permissions with 'ls -ld /tmp' to ensure it is sticky-bit protected (mode 1777). Also verify no world-writable directories exist that could host the symlink.Affected if The /tmp directory lacks proper sticky-bit permissions, allowing any user to create files there.
You are affected only if mon version 0.99.2 is installed AND the alert.d/test.alert script exists with insecure temporary file creation code that writes to test.alert.log without proper safeguards.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataReplace insecure temporary file creation with secure methods (mkstemp or O_EXCL flag), or upgrade to a patched version of mon. Restricting permissions on /tmp can provide partial mitigation.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-4477 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-4477 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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