CVE-2008-5373
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedmtx-changer.Adic-Scalar-24 in bacula-common 2.4.2 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on a /tmp/mtx.##### temporary file, probably a related issue to CVE-2005-2995.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe mtx-changer script in bacula-common 2.4.2 creates temporary files with predictable names (/tmp/mtx.#####) without properly validating that the files are not symlinks. Local users can exploit this by creating a symlink at the expected temporary file path before the script runs, causing the script to write to an arbitrary file owned by the user running the bacula component.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2.4.2CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify bacula-common versionRun 'dpkg -l bacula-common' or 'rpm -q bacula-common' or check /usr/share/doc/bacula-common/changelog.Debian.gz for version 2.4.2Affected if The installed version is bacula-common 2.4.2 exactly
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Locate the mtx-changer scriptSearch for the mtx-changer file using 'find / -name mtx-changer 2>/dev/null' or check /usr/lib/bacula/mtx-changer if installed from packagesAffected if The mtx-changer script exists on the system
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Inspect temporary file creation in the scriptRead the mtx-changer script and search for '/tmp/mtx' patterns; check if the script uses mktemp or validates symlinks before creating temp files using commands like 'ls -la /tmp/mtx*'Affected if The script creates files at /tmp/mtx.##### without using mktemp or O_EXCL flag and without checking if the path is already a symlink
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Verify write access to /tmp directoryRun 'ls -la / | grep tmp' to check /tmp permissions; try creating a test file as a non-root user to confirm write accessAffected if The /tmp directory is world-writable (mode 1777) allowing any local user to create symlinks there
The system is affected if bacula-common version 2.4.2 is installed and the mtx-changer script uses predictable temporary file names in /tmp without symlink validation.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRestrict write access to /tmp or ensure the bacula components run with appropriate file permissions. If a patch is available from the vendor, apply it to replace the insecure temporary file handling with safe methods such as mktemp or O_EXCL flag.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-5373 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-5373 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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