CVE-2008-5935
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedFacto stores sensitive information under the web root with insufficient access control, which allows remote attackers to download the database file containing the password via a direct request for database/facto.mdb. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceFacto application stores its Microsoft Access database (facto.mdb) in a web-accessible directory (/database/) without proper access controls, allowing remote attackers to directly download the database file containing plaintext or hashed passwords via HTTP request.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify if the /database/ directory is web-accessibleAttempt to access http://[target]/database/ via HTTP request and check if directory listing is returned or if the URL is reachableAffected if The directory is accessible and returns a response (200/403) rather than a 404 error
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Check if facto.mdb file exists in web rootAttempt to directly download http://[target]/database/facto.mdb via HTTP GET requestAffected if The file is served and downloaded (returns 200 OK with binary/MDB content)
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Inspect web server configuration for database directoryReview web server configuration files (e.g., httpd.conf, .htaccess) for rules allowing or blocking access to /database/ path and .mdb file typesAffected if No denial rule exists for the /database/ directory or .mdb file extension
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Confirm application is Factosystem WeblogIdentify the installed application by examining HTTP headers, HTML source, or application files for 'Factosystem' or 'Facto' brandingAffected if The application is identified as Factosystem Weblog
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Check for sensitive data exposureIf facto.mdb is downloadable, examine the database content for plaintext or hashed password fieldsAffected if The database file contains user credentials in plaintext or weak hash format
The environment is affected if the Factosystem Weblog application has its facto.mdb database file accessible via direct HTTP request in the web-accessible /database/ directory.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataMove the database file outside the web root directory and update the application's database connection path, or configure the web server to deny direct HTTP access to the database directory.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-5935 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-5935 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data