CVE-2008-7029
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUnrestricted file upload vulnerability in usercp.php in AlilG Application AliBoard Beta allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code by uploading a file with an executable extension as an avatar, then accessing it via a direct request to the file in uploads/avatars/.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe vulnerability allows authenticated users to upload files with executable extensions (such as .php) as avatars through usercp.php. These malicious files are stored in the uploads/avatars/ directory and can be directly requested, allowing arbitrary code execution on the server.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= betaCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- Single
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify Aliboard versionCheck your installed Aliboard version. Look for version information in the application footer, admin panel, or version file within the application root directory.Affected if The installed version is Aliboard beta (the only affected version)
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Locate usercp.phpVerify that the file usercp.php exists in your Aliboard installation. This is the script that handles user control panel operations including avatar uploads.Affected if usercp.php exists and is accessible to authenticated users in the beta version
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Check uploads/avatars/ directoryConfirm the existence of the uploads/avatars/ directory within your Aliboard installation. This is where uploaded avatar files are stored.Affected if The uploads/avatars/ directory exists and is web-accessible
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Verify avatar upload is enabledLog in as a standard authenticated user and navigate to the user control panel. Check if avatar upload functionality is available and accessible.Affected if Authenticated users can access and use the avatar upload feature in usercp.php
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Check for file extension validationInspect the avatar upload form in usercp.php and any server-side validation code to determine if file extension filtering exists. Look for whether .php or other executable extensions are blocked during upload.Affected if No server-side validation restricts executable file extensions (.php, .exe, etc.) from being uploaded as avatars
A user is affected if running Aliboard beta with authenticated access to avatar upload in usercp.php, where the uploads/avatars/ directory is web-accessible without script execution restrictions.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataImplement strict allowlist-based file type validation (checking both MIME type and file contents), rename uploaded files to remove executable extensions, and disable script execution in the uploads/avatars/ directory via server configuration or .htaccess rules.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,984.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-7029 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-7029 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data