CVE-2008-7082
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMyBB (aka MyBulletinBoard) 1.4.3 includes the sensitive my_post_key parameter in URLs to moderation.php with the (1) mergeposts, (2) split, and (3) deleteposts actions, which allows remote attackers to steal the token and bypass the cross-site request forgery (CSRF) protection mechanism to hijack the authentication of moderators by reading the token from the HTTP Referer header.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceMyBB 1.4.3 incorrectly includes the my_post_key CSRF token in GET URLs to moderation.php for mergeposts, split, and deleteposts actions. Since the token appears in the URL, it gets captured in HTTP Referer headers (server logs, proxy logs, browser history) and can be harvested by attackers to bypass CSRF protection and perform unauthorized moderator actions.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 1.4.3CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Partial
- Integrity
- Partial
- Availability
- Partial
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm MyBB versionCheck your MyBB installation version by viewing the version file (usually in inc/mybb.php or/admin/version.php) or by logging into the admin control panel and looking at the version displayAffected if The installed version is exactly 1.4.3
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Locate moderation.phpFind the moderation.php file in your MyBB root installation directoryAffected if The file exists in the webroot
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Inspect mergeposts action handlingOpen moderation.php and search for the 'mergeposts' action handler. Check if the my_post_key is retrieved from the URL query parameter ($mybb->input['my_post_key'] or $_GET['my_post_key']) rather than from POST bodyAffected if The code reads my_post_key from URL parameters ($_GET) for mergeposts action
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Inspect split action handlingOpen moderation.php and search for the 'split' action handler. Verify whether my_post_key is obtained from the URL query stringAffected if The code reads my_post_key from URL parameters ($_GET) for split action
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Inspect deleteposts action handlingOpen moderation.php and search for the 'deleteposts' action handler. Confirm if the token is extracted from the URL rather than POST dataAffected if The code reads my_post_key from URL parameters ($_GET) for deleteposts action
You are affected if running MyBB 1.4.3 AND any of the three moderation actions (mergeposts, split, deleteposts) read the my_post_key CSRF token from URL query parameters instead of from POST body.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataMigrate these three moderation actions from GET to POST requests, removing the my_post_key from URL parameters and passing it via POST body or custom headers instead. Apply corresponding input validation changes in the backend handler.
- Consultation3.0 h
- Implementation6.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $4,224.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2008-7082 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2008-7082 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data