CVE-2009-0220
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple stack-based buffer overflows in the PowerPoint 4.0 importer (PP4X32.DLL) in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 SP3, 2002 SP3, and 2003 SP3 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted formatting data for paragraphs in a file that uses a PowerPoint 4.0 native file format, related to (1) an incorrect calculation from a record header, or (2) an interget that is used to specify the number of bytes to copy, aka "Legacy File Format Vulnerability."
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceStack-based buffer overflows in Microsoft PowerPoint's PP4X32.dll occur when parsing PowerPoint 4.0 native file format files. The vulnerabilities stem from incorrect calculations derived from record headers and improper integer handling when specifying byte copy lengths, allowing attackers to overwrite stack memory and execute arbitrary code via crafted .ppt files.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2000= 2002= 2003CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify installed PowerPoint versionOpen PowerPoint, go to Help > About Microsoft Office PowerPoint, or check Add/Remove Programs for Microsoft Office installation. Alternatively, run 'powershell Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\*\PowerPoint\ProductRelease" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object PSChildName'Affected if Version is 2000, 2002, or 2003 (these are the only affected versions)
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Locate PP4X32.dll on the systemSearch for PP4X32.dll in typical Office installation directories such as C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office*, C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office*, or use: powershell Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Program Files","C:\Program Files (x86)" -Recurse -Filter "PP4X32.dll" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinueAffected if The file exists on the system (indicates the vulnerable component is present)
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Check for PowerPoint 4.0 file format handling capabilityThe vulnerability triggers when opening PowerPoint 4.0 native format files (.ppt files saved in PowerPoint 4.0 format). Check if users may have legacy .ppt files from older PowerPoint versions by searching for: powershell Get-ChildItem -Path "*" -Recurse -Filter "*.ppt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 10Affected if Legacy PowerPoint 4.0 format files exist in the environment and users have PowerPoint 2000-2003 capable of opening them
A system is affected if it runs PowerPoint 2000, 2002, or 2003 AND has the PP4X32.dll component present AND users may open PowerPoint 4.0 native format files.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply Microsoft security updates for affected Office versions (2000 SP3, 2002 SP3, 2003 SP3) or upgrade to unsupported versions that no longer include the vulnerable PP4X32.DLL importer. Consider blocking PowerPoint 4.0 native format files at the enterprise perimeter until patches are applied.
Microsoft Office 2010 or later (or apply MS09-017 security patch to existing Office 2000/2002/2003 installations)
- Apply Microsoft Security Bulletin MS09-017, which addresses CVE-2009-0220 and other PowerPoint vulnerabilities. This patch is available from Microsoft Update or the Microsoft Download Center.
- For Office PowerPoint 2000 SP3: Install the MS09-017 update (KB957830)
- For Office PowerPoint 2002 SP3: Install the MS09-017 update (KB957831)
- For Office PowerPoint 2003 SP3: Install the MS09-017 update (KB957832)
- After applying the patch, verify the PP4X32.DLL version has been updated to the patched version for your respective Office release.
- Consider upgrading to a supported version of Microsoft Office (2010 or later) as Office 2000/2002/2003 have reached end of support.
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2009-0220 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2009-0220 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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