Application Control Engine ModulePlugin / extension · Cisco
CVE-2009-0620
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedCisco ACE Application Control Engine Module for Catalyst 6500 Switches and 7600 Routers before A2(1.1) uses default (1) usernames and (2) passwords for (a) the administrator and (b) web management, which makes it easier for remote attackers to perform configuration changes or obtain operating-system access.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceThe Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module ships with hardcoded default usernames and passwords for both the administrator account and the web management interface. Attackers can use these known credentials to remotely authenticate to the device and make configuration changes or gain OS-level access.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data
Application Control Engine ModulePlugin / extension
<= 0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Confirm Cisco ACE module is in useIdentify if the device is a Cisco Application Control Engine Module by checking the device model, running 'show version' or reviewing hardware inventoryAffected if Device is a Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module
-
Verify administrator account default passwordAttempt to log in to the CLI or administrative interface using the default administrator username and known default password for the admin accountAffected if Default administrator credentials (username/password) are still active and allow authentication
-
Verify web management interface default credentialsAttempt to access the web management interface and authenticate using the default username and password for the web management accountAffected if Default web management credentials are still active and allow access to the management interface
-
Check for unauthorized configuration changesReview recent configuration changes using 'show configuration history' or compare current configuration to known-good baselinesAffected if Configuration changes exist that were not made by authorized personnel
User is affected if the Cisco ACE module still has default credentials active for either the administrator account or web management interface, or if unauthorized configuration changes are detected.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedImmediately change all default passwords for both the administrator and web management accounts on affected Cisco ACE modules. Verify no unauthorized access has occurred and implement a password policy to prevent future use of default credentials.
A2(1.1) or later
- 1. Identify the current version of Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module using 'show version' command
- 2. If the version is before A2(1.1), plan for an upgrade to version A2(1.1) or later
- 3. Download the fixed software from Cisco.com (requires valid service contract)
- 4. Before upgrade, backup current configuration using 'write erase' and 'copy running-config startup-config'
- 5. Upgrade the ACE module to A2(1.1) or later following Cisco's upgrade procedure
- 6. After upgrade, immediately change the default administrator password using 'username admin password <new_password>'
- 7. Change the default web management password through the web interface or CLI
- 8. Verify no default credentials remain by attempting to log in with default passwords (they should fail)
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
Fix this in Application Control Engine Module
Scoped from the published advisory
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation2.0 h
- Testing1.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $1,744.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2009-0620 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2009-0620 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data