CVE-2010-0108
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedBuffer overflow in the cliproxy.objects.1 ActiveX control in the Symantec Client Proxy (CLIproxy.dll) in Symantec AntiVirus 10.0.x, 10.1.x before MR9, and 10.2.x before MR4; and Symantec Client Security 3.0.x and 3.1.x before MR9 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long argument to the SetRemoteComputerName function.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceBuffer overflow in the cliproxy.objects.1 ActiveX control (CLIproxy.dll) in Symantec Client Proxy allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long argument to the SetRemoteComputerName function. This is a stack-based buffer overflow in an older enterprise endpoint security component.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 10.0= 10.0.1= 10.0.1.1= 10.0.2= 10.0.2.1= 10.0.2.2= 10.0.3= 10.0.4= 10.0.5= 10.0.6= 10.0.7= 10.0.8= 3.0= 3.0.0.359= 3.0.1.1000= 3.0.1.1007= 3.0.1.1008= 3.0.2= 3.0.2.2000= 3.0.2.2001= 3.0.2.2010= 3.0.2.2011= 3.0.2.2020= 3.0.2.2021= 11.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
-
Locate CLIproxy.dll on the systemSearch for CLIproxy.dll in common installation directories such as C:\Program Files\Symantec\, C:\Program Files\Common Files\Symantec Shared\, or use the command: dir /s C:\CLIproxy.dllAffected if CLIproxy.dll is found on the system and its version matches any of the affected product versions listed in the CVE (Symantec Antivirus 10.0.x, Client Security 3.0.x, or Endpoint Protection 11.0)
-
Check the installed Symantec product versionOpen the Windows Registry and navigate to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Symantec\Symantec Antivirus\Version or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Symantec\Endpoint Protection\Version, or view the product version in Add/Remove ProgramsAffected if The installed version exactly matches any version listed in the affected products: 10.0, 10.0.1, 10.0.1.1, 10.0.2, 10.0.2.1, 10.0.2.2, 10.0.3, 10.0.4, 10.0.5, 10.0.6, 10.0.7, 10.0.8 (Antivirus); 3.0, 3.0.0.359, 3.0.1.1000, 3.0.1.1007, 3.0.1.1008, 3.0.2, 3.0.2.2000, 3.0.2.2001, 3.0.2.2010, 3.0.2.2011
-
Verify if the cliproxy ActiveX control is registeredCheck the Windows Registry under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\ for a CLSID corresponding to cliproxy.objects.1, or run: reg query "HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID" /s | findstr -i "cliproxy"Affected if The ActiveX control with ProgID cliproxy.objects.1 or its associated CLSID is registered on the system
A system is affected if it runs any of the specified Symantec product versions AND has the CLIproxy.dll ActiveX control registered, enabling exploitation via the SetRemoteComputerName function.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scopedApply vendor-supplied patches (Symantec AntiVirus MR9/MR4 and Client Security MR9) or disable/remove the vulnerable CLIproxy.dll ActiveX control from affected systems.
Symantec AntiVirus/Client Security MR9 (for 10.0.x/10.1.x/3.0.x/3.1.x) or MR4 (for 10.2.x)
- Identify the exact version of Symantec product installed (Antivirus 10.0.x, 10.1.x, 10.2.x, or Client Security 3.0.x, 3.1.x)
- For Symantec AntiVirus 10.0.x and 10.1.x: Apply Maintenance Release 9 (MR9) or later patch
- For Symantec AntiVirus 10.2.x: Apply Maintenance Release 4 (MR4) or later patch
- For Symantec Client Security 3.0.x and 3.1.x: Apply Maintenance Release 9 (MR9) or later patch
- Obtain patches from official Symantec support channels or licensed subscription services
- Restart the system after applying the patch to ensure the ActiveX control is fully updated
- Verify the patch was successfully applied by checking the CLIproxy.dll version
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing3.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $3,088.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-0108 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-0108 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
Be the first to add a field note for this CVE — a mitigation you’ve verified, a version caveat, or a link to a working fix. Sign in above to contribute.
A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data