Im ManagerApplication · Symantec

CVE-2010-0112

HIGH · 7.5 CVSS v2.0 Published 2010-10-28
Fix available
A fix is available. Upgrade to after 8.4.15 or later.
See remediation →
84/100
Remediation priority · High
Remotely reachable No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in the Administrative Interface in the IIS extension in Symantec IM Manager before 8.4.16 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via (1) the rdReport parameter to rdpageimlogic.aspx, related to the sGetDefinition function in rdServer.dll, and SQL statements contained within a certain report file; (2) unspecified parameters in a DetailReportGroup (aka DetailReportGroup.lgx) action to rdpageimlogic.aspx; the (3) selclause, (4) whereTrendTimeClause, (5) TrendTypeForReport, (6) whereProtocolClause, or (7) groupClause parameter in a SummaryReportGroup (aka SummaryReportGroup.lgx) action to rdpageimlogic.aspx; the (8) loginTimeStamp, (9) dbo, (10) dateDiffParam, or (11) whereClause parameter in a LoggedInUsers (aka LoggedInUSers.lgx) action to (a) rdpageimlogic.aspx or (b) rdPage.aspx; the (12) selclause, (13) whereTrendTimeClause, (14) TrendTypeForReport, (15) whereProtocolClause, or (16) groupClause parameter to rdpageimlogic.aspx; (17) the groupList parameter to IMAdminReportTrendFormRun.asp; or (18) the email parameter to IMAdminScheduleReport.asp.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities exist in the Administrative Interface of Symantec IM Manager IIS extension before version 8.4.16. Attackers can inject arbitrary SQL commands through numerous parameters in rdpageimlogic.aspx (rdReport, selclause, whereTrendTimeClause, TrendTypeForReport, whereProtocolClause, groupClause, loginTimeStamp, dbo, dateDiffParam, whereClause), rdPage.aspx (loginTimeStamp, dbo, dateDiffParam, whereClause), IMAdminReportTrendFormRun.asp (groupList), and IMAdminScheduleReport.asp (email). The vulnerabilities allow remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the affected parameters.

MitigationUpgrade to Symantec IM Manager version 8.4.16 or later to obtain the vendor patch. If immediate upgrading is not feasible, implement input validation and parameterized queries on the affected ASP pages, and restrict access to the administrative interface via network segmentation or VPN.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
Im ManagerApplication
Affected:<= 8.4.15= 6.0= 6.5= 7.0= 7.5= 8.3= 8.4.0= 8.4.1= 8.4.2= 8.4.5= 8.4.6= 8.4.7

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Partial
Integrity
Partial
Availability
Partial

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Confirm Symantec IM Manager installation
    Locate the IIS web root directory (typically C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\ or a custom path) and look for the IM Manager administrative interface folders. Check for presence of files named rdpageimlogic.aspx, rdPage.aspx, IMAdminReportTrendFormRun.asp, or IMAdminScheduleReport.asp.
    Affected if These ASPX/ASP files exist in the IIS web directory, indicating the administrative interface is present.
  2. Identify installed version
    Check the version of Symantec IM Manager installed. Common locations include: the Windows Programs and Features list, the version information in the IIS extension DLLs, or check for a version.txt/readme file in the installation directory. Compare your version number against the affected list: 6.0, 6.5, 7.0, 7.5, 8.3, 8.4.0, 8.4.1, 8.4.2, 8.4.5, 8.4.6, 8.4.7, or any version 8.4.15 or lower.
    Affected if The installed version matches any of the affected versions listed or is 8.4.15 or lower.
  3. Verify Administrative Interface is exposed
    Check if the IIS website or application hosting the IM Manager administrative interface is accessible from the network. Use IIS Manager to review site bindings and determine if the application is accessible externally or internally without VPN restriction.
    Affected if The administrative ASPX/ASP pages are reachable over the network without network segmentation or authentication barriers.
  4. Inspect vulnerable parameter usage
    Review HTTP access logs for the affected pages (rdpageimlogic.aspx, rdPage.aspx, IMAdminReportTrendFormRun.asp, IMAdminScheduleReport.asp) and look for requests containing the vulnerable parameters: rdReport, selclause, whereTrendTimeClause, TrendTypeForReport, whereProtocolClause, groupClause, loginTimeStamp, dbo, dateDiffParam, whereClause, groupList, or email.

You are affected if Symantec IM Manager is installed with a version 8.4.15 or lower (or any of the specific affected versions 6.0 through 8.4.7) and the administrative interface pages are accessible on your network.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Upgrade available Upgrade to a release after 8.4.15
Interim mitigation

Upgrade to Symantec IM Manager version 8.4.16 or later to obtain the vendor patch. If immediate upgrading is not feasible, implement input validation and parameterized queries on the affected ASP pages, and restrict access to the administrative interface via network segmentation or VPN.

Fix this in Im Manager Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation8.0 h
  • Implementation16.0 h
  • Testing12.0 h
  • Review / QA4.0 h
40.0 hours of engineering $7,000
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Scan for this in your stack

Free · runs locally
dbcve dependency scanner

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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-0112 in production — separate from our analysis above.

No notes yet

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What this is

A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.

What belongs here
  • Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
  • Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
  • No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
  • No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data