CVE-2010-5198
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedMultiple untrusted search path vulnerabilities in Intuit QuickBooks 2010 allow local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse (1) dbicudtx11.dll, (2) mfc90enu.dll, or (3) mfc90loc.dll file in the current working directory, as demonstrated by a directory that contains a .des, .qbo, or .qpg file. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceQuickBooks 2010 contains untrusted search path vulnerabilities where the application loads DLLs from the current working directory without validating the path. When a user opens .des, .qbo, or .qpg files from a directory containing malicious versions of dbicudtx11.dll, mfc90enu.dll, or mfc90loc.dll, these DLLs execute with the application's privileges, allowing local privilege escalation.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 2010CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify QuickBooks 2010 installation and versionCheck the Windows registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Intuit\QuickBooks or look for QuickBooks 2010 in Add/Remove Programs. The version will display as 2010.Affected if QuickBooks version 2010 is installed.
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Identify vulnerable DLL file presenceSearch the QuickBooks installation directory (commonly C:\Program Files\Intuit\QuickBooks 2010\) for the files dbicudtx11.dll, mfc90enu.dll, and mfc90loc.dll.Affected if Any of these three DLL files exist in the QuickBooks installation folder.
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Confirm file type associationsCheck Windows registry for .des, .qbo, and .qpg file extensions under HKCR\.des, HKCR\.qbo, and HKCR\.qpg to verify they are associated with QuickBooks.Affected if These file extensions are registered to open with QuickBooks.
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Assess directory access riskDetermine if users have permission to place files in directories from which they commonly open QuickBooks documents (such as Downloads, Desktop, or shared network folders).Affected if Users can open .des, .qbo, or .qpg files from directories they control or share with other users.
A user is affected if QuickBooks 2010 is installed, the vulnerable DLLs exist in the installation directory, and users can open the associated file types from directories where malicious DLLs could be placed.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataThis is a code-level vulnerability requiring Intuit to fix the DLL loading behavior. Users should avoid opening QuickBooks files from untrusted or shared directories and only work from trusted locations. The vendor should implement safe DLL search path ordering (using SetDllDirectory or explicitly specifying full paths).
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-5198 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-5198 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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