CVE-2010-5219
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUntrusted search path vulnerability in SmartFTP 4.0.1140.0 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse dwmapi.dll file in the current working directory, as demonstrated by a directory that contains a .txt, .html, or .mpg file. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · moderate confidenceSmartFTP 4.0.1140.0 has an untrusted search path vulnerability where it loads the dwmapi.dll library from the current working directory instead of using secure system paths. An attacker can place a malicious dwmapi.dll in a directory containing common file types (.txt, .html, .mpg), and when a user opens that directory with SmartFTP, the application executes the attacker's code with the user's privileges.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= .0.1140.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Verify SmartFTP installationCheck for SmartFTP installation directories, typically in Program Files or Program Files (x86). Common paths include C:\Program Files\SmartFTP\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\SmartFTP\.Affected if SmartFTP is installed on the system
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Determine SmartFTP versionLocate the SmartFTP executable (usually Client.exe or SmartFTP.exe) and check its version property, or use Windows Programs and Features to view installed program details.Affected if The installed version is exactly 4.0.1140.0
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Confirm vulnerable DLL loading behaviorObserve that SmartFTP loads dwmapi.dll from the current working directory when opening directories containing files like .txt, .html, or .mpg. This can be verified by monitoring DLL loading with process monitoring tools.Affected if SmartFTP loads dwmapi.dll from the current working directory instead of secure system paths (this is inherent to version 4.0.1140.0)
You are affected if SmartFTP version 4.0.1140.0 is installed and you open directories containing files where an attacker could place a malicious dwmapi.dll.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataAvoid launching SmartFTP from or opening directories containing untrusted files. The vendor should implement secure DLL loading by using full path specifications or safe DLL search mode settings. Users should ensure Windows DLL search order is configured securely.
- Consultation1.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing8.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-5219 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-5219 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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