CVE-2010-5232
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUntrusted search path vulnerability in DivX Plus Player 8.1.0 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse ssleay32.dll file in a certain directory. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · low confidenceThis is a DLL hijacking (untrusted search path) vulnerability in DivX Plus Player 8.1.0. The application loads the ssleay32.dll (OpenSSL library) without using a full path, allowing an attacker to place a malicious DLL in a directory that gets searched before the legitimate location. When the application runs, it loads the attacker's DLL instead, executing arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the application.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data= 8.1.0CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm DivX Plus Player installationCheck for DivX Plus Player 8.1.0 installation by examining Program Files directory (C:\Program Files\DivX\DivX Plus Player\) or using Windows Add/Remove Programs. Verify the exact version number from the application's About or Help menu.Affected if DivX Plus Player version 8.1.0 is installed on the system
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Locate ssleay32.dllSearch for ssleay32.dll files on the system using file search or command: 'dir /s /b C:\ssleay32.dll'. Check the application directory, system directories (System32, SysWOW64), and user-accessible directories.Affected if ssleay32.dll exists in multiple locations, particularly outside the application's installation directory or in world-writable directories
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Examine DLL search behaviorUse Process Monitor (procmon.exe) from Sysinternals to trace DLL loading when DivX Plus Player launches. Set a filter for Path containing ssleay32.dll and observe which location the application loads the DLL from.Affected if The application loads ssleay32.dll from a directory other than its own installation folder, or from a directory that may contain user-controlled content (current working directory, downloads, temp folders)
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Check for presence in search path directoriesExamine directories in the DLL search order: current working directory, application directory, system directories, PATH environment variable directories. Look for ssleay32.dll in any of these locations that an attacker could modify.Affected if ssleay32.dll is found in a directory that precedes the legitimate DivX installation directory in the search order, or in a directory with weaker access controls
A user is affected if DivX Plus Player 8.1.0 is installed and the application loads ssleay32.dll from a location other than its own installation folder, particularly from directories that could be controlled by an attacker.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataRemediate by implementing secure DLL search order, using absolute/fully-qualified paths for all DLL loads, or enabling Safe DLL Search Mode to prevent loading from current working directory.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing4.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-5232 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-5232 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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