dbcve.org
PowerdirectorApplication · Cyberlink

CVE-2010-5237

MEDIUM · 6.9 CVSS v2.0 Published 2012-09-07
Mitigation only
No fix yet — a mitigation exists. There is no fixed release. A documented workaround reduces exposure in the meantime.
See remediation →
74/100
Remediation priority · Elevated
No privileges Zero-click

Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.

NVD · unedited
Untrusted search path vulnerability in CyberLink PowerDirector 7 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse mfc71loc.dll file in the current working directory, as demonstrated by a directory that contains a .pdl, .iso, .pds, .p2g, or .p2i file. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.

Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.

dbcve analysis · high confidence

Untrusted search path (DLL hijacking) vulnerability in CyberLink PowerDirector 7 allows local privilege escalation. The application loads the DLL 'mfc71loc.dll' from the current working directory instead of a secure system path, enabling attackers to place a malicious DLL in directories containing .pdl, .iso, .p2g, or .p2i files to achieve code execution with the privileges of the user running the application.

MitigationUsers should run PowerDirector only from trusted directories and avoid opening files from untrusted locations. If a vendor patch is available, apply it. Consider removing file associations or using application sandboxing as additional controls until the software can be updated.

Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.

Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.

NVD · CPE data
PowerdirectorApplication
Affected:= 7.0

CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.

From the vector
Attack vector
Local
Complexity
M
Authentication
None
Confidentiality
Complete
Integrity
Complete
Availability
Complete

AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.

dbcve checks

Work through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.

  1. Identify if CyberLink PowerDirector 7 is installed
    Check the Windows registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\CyberLink\PowerDirector or look in common installation paths like C:\Program Files\CyberLink\PowerDirector7. Verify the version string in the registry or the executable's properties.
    Affected if PowerDirector version 7.0 is installed on the system
  2. Confirm the application loads mfc71loc.dll
    Open Process Monitor (from Sysinternals), set a filter for PowerDirector.exe and path containing mfc71loc.dll, then launch the application or open an associated file (.pdl, .iso, .p2g, .p2i). Look for DLL load attempts from the current working directory.
    Affected if The application attempts to load mfc71loc.dll from a directory other than the System32 or PowerDirector install folder
  3. Check for vulnerable file type associations
    Review Windows file associations for extensions .pdl, .iso, .p2g, and .p2i. Use 'assoc' command or check HKCR\.pdl, HKCR\.iso, HKCR\.p2g, HKCR\.p2i in the registry to see if PowerDirector is registered as the handler.
    Affected if Any of these extensions (.pdl, .iso, .p2g, .p2i) are associated with PowerDirector and the application is used to open files from user-controlled directories
  4. Test DLL search order behavior
    Create a test directory with a sample file extension (.pdl, .iso, .p2g, or .p2i), place a harmless DLL named mfc71loc.dll in that directory, and run PowerDirector to open that file. Monitor which DLL paths are loaded using Process Monitor.
    Affected if PowerDirector loads mfc71loc.dll from the same directory as the opened file instead of a secure system path

The system is affected if CyberLink PowerDirector version 7.0 is installed and opens files from directories where a malicious mfc71loc.dll could be placed, which is particularly risky when handling .pdl, .iso, .p2g, or .p2i files from untrusted locations.

Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.

Check your environment

Paste your version and any relevant configuration and it will be compared against the affected criteria above. Do not include secrets or credentials.

AI-assisted, checked against the advisory. Informational, not a guarantee.

Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.

From vendor data
Mitigation available No clean upgrade yet — mitigate in the meantime
Mitigation

Users should run PowerDirector only from trusted directories and avoid opening files from untrusted locations. If a vendor patch is available, apply it. Consider removing file associations or using application sandboxing as additional controls until the software can be updated.

Fix this in Powerdirector Scoped from the published advisory
  • Consultation2.0 h
  • Implementation4.0 h
  • Testing2.0 h
  • Review / QA1.0 h
9.0 hours of engineering $1,600
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References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.

Primary sources

Practitioner notes

Contributed

Peer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-5237 in production — separate from our analysis above.

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