CVE-2010-5273
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedUntrusted search path vulnerability in Altova DiffDog 2011 Enterprise Edition SP1 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse dwmapi.dll file in the current working directory, as demonstrated by a directory that contains a .dbdif file. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceAltova DiffDog 2011 Enterprise Edition SP1 is vulnerable to DLL hijacking via an untrusted search path. The application loads dwmapi.dll from the current working directory instead of the system directory, allowing a local attacker to place a malicious DLL that gets executed when a user opens a directory containing a specially crafted .dbdif file.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- M
- Authentication
- None
- Confidentiality
- Complete
- Integrity
- Complete
- Availability
- Complete
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Confirm Altova DiffDog 2011 is installedCheck the installed programs list in Windows Control Panel or look for DiffDog 2011 in Program Files (typically C:\Program Files\Altova\DiffDog2011\).Affected if Altova DiffDog 2011 Enterprise Edition (any version) is installed on the system.
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Verify dwmapi.dll is used by DiffDogExamine the DiffDog application directory for dependencies or use a tool like dumpbin /dependents on DiffDog.exe to list loaded DLLs. Check if dwmapi.dll is listed as a dependency.Affected if The DiffDog executable attempts to load dwmapi.dll at runtime.
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Check if current directory DLL loading is possibleInspect the application behavior or configuration for settings that control DLL search paths. Look for whether the application uses safe DLL search order (system directory first) or allows loading from the current working directory.Affected if The application loads DLLs from the current working directory instead of exclusively from the system directory, leaving the DLL search path vulnerable to hijacking.
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Identify accessible directories with .dbdif filesSearch the file system for .dbdif files in directories that are writable by standard users or that might be opened by DiffDog (such as user documents, shared folders, or download directories).Affected if A directory containing a specially crafted .dbdif file is accessible and can be opened by DiffDog, allowing an attacker to place a malicious dwmapi.dll in that same directory.
A user is affected if Altova DiffDog 2011 is installed and the application can be triggered to open a directory containing both a .dbdif file and a malicious dwmapi.dll placed in the current working directory.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataEnsure the application uses safe DLL search paths by calling SetDllDirectory with the proper system DLL path, or statically link the required DLL, eliminating reliance on the current working directory for DLL resolution.
- Consultation4.0 h
- Implementation8.0 h
- Testing6.0 h
- Review / QA2.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $5,600.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-5273 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-5273 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
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