CVE-2010-5305
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedThe potential exists for exposure of the product's password used to restrict unauthorized access to Rockwell PLC5/SLC5/0x/RSLogix 1785-Lx and 1747-L5x controllers. The potential exists for an unauthorized programming and configuration client to gain access to the product and allow changes to the product’s configuration or program. When applicable, upgrade product firmware to a version that includes enhanced security functionality compatible with Rockwell Automation's FactoryTalk Security services.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceHardcoded or exposed passwords in Rockwell PLC5, SLC5, and 1747-L5x controllers allow unauthorized programming and configuration clients to bypass access controls, potentially modifying controller programs and configurations.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE dataall versionsall versionsall versionsCVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify PLC5 and SLC5 controller models in useInventory the physical PLC hardware or review network scan results to determine if PLC5 1785-Lx or SLC5/01 1747-L5x controllers are present in the environmentAffected if Any PLC5 1785-Lx or SLC5/01 1747-L5x controllers are found in the environment, they are affected since all firmware versions are vulnerable
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Identify Rslogix software installationsList installed software on engineering workstations and programming consoles to identify Rslogix installations used for these controllersAffected if Rslogix is installed and used to program the affected PLC models, the vulnerability applies
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Check for default or unchanged passwordsReview PLC configuration settings and access control lists to determine if default passwords remain in place or if passwords are hardcoded in the controller configurationAffected if Default, hardcoded, or exposed passwords are configured or no password protection is enforced on the controller programming interface
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Assess network exposure of controllersReview network segmentation and firewall rules to determine if the PLC controllers are accessible from unauthorized network segments or external networksAffected if The controllers are reachable from network segments beyond the trusted control system network, allowing unauthorized programming clients to connect
If PLC5 1785-Lx or SLC5/01 1747-L5x controllers are in use with Rslogix and either default passwords are present or the controllers are network-accessible to untrusted hosts, the environment is affected by this vulnerability.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
From vendor dataUpgrade controller firmware to versions with enhanced security functionality compatible with Rockwell Automation's FactoryTalk Security services.
- Consultation10.0 h
- Implementation12.0 h
- Testing10.0 h
- Review / QA6.0 h
An estimate, not a bill — we confirm scope with you before any work starts. Need it this week? Rush from $10,784.
Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-5305 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-5305 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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A place for practitioners to share what actually worked: a mitigation you’ve tested, a configuration change, a version- or environment-specific caveat, or a link to a verified patch. The most useful notes rise to the top as peers upvote them, so the signal stays high.
- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
- No weaponised exploit code, or anything meant to cause harm
- No spam, self-promotion, credentials, or personal data