CVE-2010-5330
Official description Straight from the sourceThe vendor's or NVD's own wording, published unedited. Authoritative, but often terse — it says what broke, rarely what to do.
NVD · uneditedOn certain Ubiquiti devices, Command Injection exists via a GET request to stainfo.cgi (aka Show AP info) because the ifname variable is not sanitized, as demonstrated by shell metacharacters. The fixed version is v4.0.1 for 802.11 ISP products, v5.3.5 for AirMax ISP products, and v5.4.5 for AirSync firmware. For example, Nanostation5 (Air OS) is affected.
Technical summary Written by usOur analysis, written from the advisory, the CVSS vector and the affected-version data. It adds context the advisory leaves out, and never invents facts that are not in the source.
dbcve analysis · high confidenceCommand injection vulnerability in Ubiquiti device web interface (stainfo.cgi) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands via unsanitized ifname parameter containing shell metacharacters in a GET request.
Verify against the referenced sources before acting — the references below are authoritative for this CVE, this summary is not.
Affected products & versions What the vendor confirmedThe version ranges the vendor confirmed as vulnerable. If your version sits inside a range here, treat yourself as exposed until you have upgraded.
NVD · CPE data< 4.0.1>= 4.0.2, < 5.3.5>= 5.3.6, < 5.4.5CVSS breakdown How the score is builtThe industry scoring standard. It rates how the flaw is reached, what it takes to exploit, and what an attacker gains — the score is derived from those, not the other way round.
From the vector- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Am I affected? How to checkSteps we derive from the advisory and the affected-version data, so you can decide whether this CVE reaches your setup. They are a guide, not a scan — your own configuration is the authority.
dbcve checksWork through these to decide whether this CVE applies to you.
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Identify the Ubiquiti device modelAccess the device web interface or use SSH to run 'cat /proc/cpuinfo' or check the management UI for the device model name (e.g., Nanostation5)Affected if The device is a Ubiquiti Nanostation5 or other model running AirOS firmware
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Check the AirOS firmware versionLog into the device web UI (System tab) or use SSH to run 'cat /etc/version' to retrieve the firmware version numberAffected if The firmware version is < 4.0.1 OR (>= 4.0.2 AND < 5.3.5) OR (>= 5.3.6 AND < 5.4.5)
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Verify if the stainfo.cgi web interface is accessibleAttempt to access 'http://<device_ip>//cgi-bin/stainfo.cgi' from a network-connected host. A successful HTTP 200 response indicates the interface is enabledAffected if The stainfo.cgi endpoint returns a valid response (the web management interface is enabled and reachable)
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Confirm remote management is enabledCheck the device web UI under System > Site Settings or use SSH to inspect configuration files in /etc/persistent/ to see if remote web access is permittedAffected if Remote web management is enabled and the device is accessible from an attacker's network position
A user is affected if they have a Ubiquiti device (e.g., Nanostation5) running AirOS firmware versions < 4.0.1, 4.0.2 to < 5.3.5, or 5.3.6 to < 5.4.5, with the stainfo.cgi web interface exposed and remote management enabled.
Generated from the published advisory. Verify against your own configuration.
Remediation Closing itWhat it takes to close this. Where a vendor fix exists we point at it; where none exists we say so plainly, and can build one. Effort estimates are scoped from the advisory, not from your codebase.
dbcve · scoped4.0.15.3.55.4.5
Upgrade affected Ubiquiti devices to the fixed firmware versions (v4.0.1 for 802.11 ISP, v5.3.5 for AirMax ISP, v5.4.5 for AirSync) or restrict network access to the management interface to prevent external exploitation.
AirOS v4.0.1 (802.11 ISP products), v5.3.5 (AirMax ISP products), or v5.4.5 (AirSync firmware)
- 1. Identify the Ubiquiti device model and current AirOS firmware version via the web UI or SSH (cat /etc/version)
- 2. Determine the product type: 802.11 ISP products (e.g., Nanostation2, Nanostation5), AirMax ISP products, or AirSync firmware
- 3. For 802.11 ISP products: upgrade to AirOS v4.0.1 or later
- 4. For AirMax ISP products: upgrade to v5.3.5 or later (or preferably latest 5.x release)
- 5. For AirSync firmware: upgrade to v5.4.5 or later
- 6. Download the appropriate firmware from the official Ubiquiti Downloads portal (https://www.ui.com/download)
- 7. Access the device's web interface, navigate to the System or Maintenance section
- 8. Upload the firmware file and allow the device to reboot
Generated from the published advisory — verify against the referenced sources before acting.
- Consultation2.0 h
- Implementation4.0 h
- Testing2.0 h
- Review / QA1.0 h
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Scan for this in your stack
Free · runs locallyCheck whether your project pulls in CVE-2010-5330 — or any other known-vulnerable package — straight from your lock files. Free and open source; it runs locally and uploads nothing.
References Go to the primary sourcePrimary sources — vendor advisories, patches and trackers. Where our summary and a reference disagree, the reference wins.
Primary sourcesPractitioner notes
ContributedPeer-ranked notes from engineers who’ve handled CVE-2010-5330 in production — separate from our analysis above.
The advisory tells you what broke. It rarely tells you what actually worked. If you’ve dealt with this one, that detail is what the next engineer is searching for.
- The version that genuinely resolved it — not the one the vendor claimed
- A config change or rule that shut the vector down
- A gotcha in the upgrade path that cost you an afternoon
No notes yet
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- Verified mitigations, workarounds, and config changes
- Version or environment caveats, and links to real fixes
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